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ABSTRACT 
 
ANALYZING SECULARISM MODELS: THE CASE OF TURKEY 
 
Akdemir, Kevser Hülya. 
MA in Political Science and International Relations 
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin 
July 2018, 75 Pages 
 
This thesis examines the models of secularism in the world, which are discussed in the 
literature extensively and tries to categorize secularism models that Turkey has 
experienced in the Republican Era. Since secularism is an ambiguous term the thesis first 
aims to draw a structure about the meanings loaded on secularism; and then classifies 
different secularism models that modern secular states practice. After making a core 
categorization on that arena, the thesis analyzes the historical background of Republican 
Turkey and categorizes its secularism experience into three terms. While the first term 
is from the birth of the Turkish Republic to 1950 that is the date of transition to a 
democratic multi-party system, the second term involves the term from the 1950s to 
2002. This period witnessed the conflict of conservative parties and secular state 
bureaucracy with regards to the handling of secularism. Lastly, the thesis argues that the 
AK Party policies have transformed Turkey’s secularism into a passive or soft version, 
which functions in the form of twin tolerations. Hence, the thesis follows Alfred Stepan’s 
twin toleration and Jonathan Fox’s separatist mode of secularism conceptualization for 
this third term of the Turkish Republic. In this third term, the state has extended the 
sphere of religious freedoms and embraced a more neutral stance compared to the 
earlier centrist, top-down notion of secularism (1923-1950) and the contestation era 
between the centrist and peripheral notions of secularism (1950-2002). 
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ÖZ 
 
SEKÜLERİZM MODELLERİNİN İNCELENMESİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ 
 
Akdemir, Kevser Hülya. 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Hüseyin Alptekin 
Temmuz 2018, 75 Sayfa 
 
Bu tez, geniş bir literatüre dayalı olarak dünyadaki laiklik modellerini incelemekte ve 
Cumhuriyet döneminde yaşanmakta olan Türkiye laiklik modellerini kategorize etmeye 
çalışmaktadır. Tez önce laiklik üzerine yüklenen anlamlar hakkında bir yapı çizmeyi ve 
daha sonra modern seküler devletlerde uygulanan farklı laiklik modellerini 
sınıflandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu alanda çekirdek bir sınıflandırma yaptıktan sonra, 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin tarihsel arka planını analiz etmekte ve laiklik deneyimini üç ana 
başlık altında toplamaktadır. İlk dönem, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin doğuşundan çok partili 
bir sisteme geçiş tarihi olan 1950'ye kadar iken, ikinci dönem 1950'den 2002'ye kadar 
olan dönemi kapsamaktadır. Bu dönem, laikliğin ele alınması ile ilgili olarak muhafazakar 
partilerin ve laik devlet bürokrasisinin çatışmasına tanıklık etmiştir. Son olarak, tez, AK 
Parti politikalarının Türkiye'deki sekülerizm anlayışını, ikili hoşgörüye dayanan biçimde 
daha pasif veya yumuşak bir versiyona dönüştürdüğünü savunuyor. Bu nedenle, tez 
Türkiye’nin üçüncü dönemi için Alfred Stepan’ın ikiz hoşgörüsü ve Jonathan Fox’un 
ayrılıkçı laiklik modellerini takip ediyor. Bu üçüncü dönemde, devlet din özgürlüğü alanını 
genişletmiş ve daha önceki merkezci, yukarıdan aşağıya dayatılan katı laiklik anlayışına 
(1923-1950) ve merkez- çevre arasındaki kısır mücadeleye (1950 -2002) kıyasla daha 
tarafsız ve müsamahakar bir duruş benimsemiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sekülerizm Modelleri, AK Parti, Kemalizm, Türkiye Sekülerizmi  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Research Question and Significance of the Problem 
One of the leading debates on secularism and democracy is whether religion is 
compatible with secularism. How have different countries developed relations between 
secularism and democracy? Does it differ depending on the religion of the majority in a 
country? A strand of literature  (Ginsburg, 2007) make a separation according to state 
constitutions to define whether a country is secular, some others (Glover, 1984) look for 
the answer in the cultural and historical heritage of the country or some authors (Shiner, 
1967) list other specific variables to categorize a state as secular or not. As a result of 
this, while having literature review, this thesis tends to focus on the authors who have 
studied secularism with a quantitative method and who have served specific variables 
and results for different countries in terms of secularism. Some see secularism as an 
inevitable process while some others contingent. For instance, modernization theory 
sees secularization in a universalistic and determinist way by arguing “modernisation 
leads to a decline in religion’s role in the public realm, with it turning into a matter for 
the private sphere” (Başkan, 2010, p. 168). In contrast, this thesis argues that secularism 
does not have a rigid and universal form, but its functioning varies from one place to 
another, from one term to another. 
 
Such a diversity of the practice of secularism leads to major issues and becomes a 
battlefront in politics. While this battle is mostly peaceful in Western societies, the rest 
of the world often witnesses violent conflict or deep antagonisms. It is very significant to 
solve such conflict around the notion of secularism and its practice. Nevertheless, the 
first step is the right diagnosis which requires close engagement with the 
conceptualization of secularism. This research aims to conceptualize secularism in the 
academic literature and apply it to the Turkish case. In this direction, the leading research 
question of this thesis is “How the AK Party has transformed the understanding and 
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practice of secularism in Turkey?” In order to provide historical background and context 
to this research question, the thesis also conceptualizes Turkey’s secularism experience 
prior to the AK Party era. 
 
1.2. What is Secularism? 
Before delving deeper into the main question, a conceptual debate on secularism is 
provided in order to have a background for this study. Although there are studies to 
answer these kinds of questions after democracy first born on the Western world, it is 
beneficial to start with Samuel Huntington to see a basic categorization to evaluate a 
state democratic and secular or not. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of the World Order shows how predictions of civilizational perspective about 
the relationship between state and religion and also position of Western and non-
Western countries' dialogue with democracy and secularism has controverted. 
Huntington evaluates states under two main groups: Western and non-Western 
civilizations. He argues that the main aspect of a state in the group of “Western 
civilization” is directly connected to Christianity by saying: “Western Christianity … is 
historically the single most important characteristic of Western civilization” (Huntington, 
1996, p. 70). 
 
More importantly, he discusses the significance of separation of church and state as a 
key figure of Western civilization. He evaluates Islam as one of the main obstacles in 
front of the democracy because it does not have a separation between religion and state. 
He makes a rigid division between Christianity and Islam, Confucianism, and Orthodoxy 
in terms of separation of religion and state that is called as ‘laicism’ in modern 
democracies. He describes democracy over the separation of religion and state and 
argues that only Christian countries can have this democratic and laic values. For 
instance, Islam is seen as a religion that is inherently anti-democratic and anti-secular. 
According to opponents to Islam, because Prophet Muhammed compounded military 
and spiritual authority and because of the Koran, in which God dictated fixed laws to be 
good Muslim it is impossible to have a democratic public opinion. Yet, Alfred Stepan 
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rejects such arguments and argues all great religious civilizations are multivocal 
(Huntington, 1996, p. 48). He draws a line across ‘Western Christianity’ to refer Western 
civilization and separate it out of the world culture. As he indicates that “Where does 
Europe end? ...Where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.” (Ibid, 
p.158) As understood from the quotations, the key element of democracy and 
secularism is the concept of “civilization” rather than a state itself. He furthermore 
argues that only states belonging to the Western Christian civilization can be ruled with 
a secular democratic administration. 
 
Talal Asad describes “secular” as a part of the theological discourse, and he describes 
“religious” as a phase-shaped by secular and political discourses, so religion as a 
universal globalized concept constructed by Western secular modernity (Asad, 2003, p. 
192). Jose Casanova argues that secularism evaluated as an internal transformation of 
Western Christianity (Casanova, Religion: Beyond the Concept: Public Religions 
Revisited, 2008); and secularism was born with democracy. 
 
In a similar manner, Nurullah Ardıç presents different definitions of secularism for both 
Western and Middle Eastern countries. According to him while secularism was born as a 
tool for development in the Western world, it led to a conflict paradigm because of its 
Muslim identity in the Middle Eastern countries (Ardıç, 2012). In such a point, Turkey is 
one of the countries that have experienced a conflict paradigm after the establishment 
of the Kemalist order in the light of Western secularism. Scientific development, the 
Industrial Revolution, and rising of democracy in the West led to speeding the 
modernization process, and secularism was born as guarantor of democratic regimes in 
the West. As a result of this, developing Middle Eastern countries firstly aimed to apply 
modernization process, but their Islamic identities caused to face with a conflict between 
secularism and Islam (Ibid).  
 
It is also argued that social, historical and traditional background of the states and 
political and economic positions of the countries also affect the context of the 
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secularism. This is to say that states are interpreted their own secularism definitions and 
models by making a harmonization between general standards of the secularism and the 
domestic reasons. 
 
1.3. Thesis Outline 
This thesis first aims to analyze secularism models in the world literature, and later 
describes Turkey’s secularism models according to criteria that were discussed in the 
world literature. The leading research question in the thesis is to discover which type of 
secularism models have been applied in the world states. Therefore, democratic 
Western states are the main cases in the thesis. After listing the main categorizations 
about secularism models in the world, the thesis analyzes Turkey’s historical background. 
Because Turkey has a volatile political atmosphere, it has different periods in terms of 
the application of political, social and economic principles. The thesis analyzes the 
important periods in the history of the Turkish Republic but especially focuses on the 
period when the AK Party came to power. In this direction, the leading research question 
in this research is what kind of secularism model has been adopted in the period of the 
AK Party? 
 
The thesis firstly presents a literature review to discuss secularism models in the world. 
After analyzing all models, the thesis focuses on which model is the most suitable one 
that describes Turkey. What follows is a historical review because Turkey has different 
political equilibriums according to the political parties in the power. Then the thesis 
describes how Turkish secularism has changed during the AK Party era. Here the thesis 
argues that the AK Party has transformed the Turkish Republic’s Kemalist secularism 
model into a more liberal version. Although problems that were born because of the 
conflicts between the state and religion could not be solved totally, it is clear that tension 
with state bureaucracy and religious people has decreased by widening religious rights 
and by considering the importance of religion for the Turkish people. 
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The thesis consists of five chapters. Following the introductory part, the thesis presents 
a literature review to discuss secularism models in the world, and it focuses on the 
criteria for measuring secularism in the world. Then it deals with the historical 
background of the Turkish Republic in terms of applying secularism policies. After that, 
it focuses on the AK Party era and how it has transformed secularism in Turkey. In the 
end, the conclusion part draws attention to the main ﬁndings and the insights of the 
research suggestions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SECULARISM MODELLING ACCORDING TO WORLD LITERATURE 
 
2.1.      Twin Tolerations Model of Alfred Stepan 
While democracy promises to all citizens and social groups to express their own thinking 
and beliefs as a right, particular forms of secularism may lead to limit some expressions 
in terms of religious freedom. Especially European countries governed by democracy 
have to face these kinds of questions. Alfred Stepan analyzes European countries’ 
secularism models by looking at their attitudes toward religious civil groups in his study 
of “Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations.” He focuses on the idea of “twin 
tolerations” to construct the freedom for religious organizations in civil and political 
societies in democratic Western European states. He argues that “the separation of 
‘church and state’ does not describe ‘secularism’ and separation of church and state has 
no inherent affinity with democracy” (Stepan, 2000, p. 43). He first focuses on the 
relations of religion and state in 15 EU countries and clarified that five of them (Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Sweden, and the UK) had established the church. Moreover, Norway as 
a non-EU but democratic Western state had an established church.  
 
The article also discusses Germany and Austria as countries that do not have an 
established church but have constitutional points to permit local groups to decide on the 
role of the religion in education (Ibid, p. 41). It is also known that Christian Democratic 
parties were in power in Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Portugal 
is a unique EU country that avoids parties from representing religious symbols. Yet 
Stepan considers prohibition as a non-democratic decision. He also gives examples of 
misinterpretation of secularism in democratic countries such as Turkey. Because 
secularism was accepted as a hostile separation of religion and state, after an Islamic 
based political party governed Turkey in 1996, it is seen as a threat to Western-style 
secular democracy (Ibid, p. 40) and then the democratically elected government faced 
with a military coup in 1997. As the Turkish case shows, secularism does not have a 
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unique form and democracy is not a prior condition of secularism. Casanova also 
supports this claim as he argues that there are multiple models of secularization in 
modern Western countries. Yet, according to him, the difference is originated from 
Christianity as a link to the belief that “secularism is a transformation of Christianity.” 
Hence, the main historical differences between Catholic, Protestant, and Byzantine 
Christianity, and between Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism led to different forms of 
secularism in modern Western countries. Meanwhile, Spain in 1931 and France in 1905 
experienced hostile separations of church and state, but now all Western European 
states have left rigid separation between religion and state and reached to a more 
democratic form of secularism. However, they have allowed religious groups to be visible 
in civil and political society as well. According to all findings, it would not be wrong to 
argue that secularism does not mean a rigid form of separation between state and 
religion; instead, it means a balance of them by reconstruction of twin tolerations (Ibid, 
40). 
 
Alfred Stepan makes a separation between twin tolerations and intolerations and lists 
varieties of democratic and non- democratic patterns of religious – state relations 
(Stepan, 2000, pp. 42-43). While twin tolerations are seen at democratic states, twin 
intolerations are associated with non-democratic states. Varieties of democratic 
patterns are mainly divided into two: relatively stable patterns and relatively unstable 
patterns. Relatively stable patterns serve three kinds of state models: “secular but 
friendly to religion, non-secular but friendly for democracy and sociologically 
spontaneous secularism” (Stepan, 2000, pp. 42-43). Relatively unstable patterns are 
seen in states which are unfriendly toward secularism. On the other hand, varieties of 
nondemocratic patterns are mainly divided into two categories: state proscribe a 
necessary level of self-determination for religion in politics and religious groups preclude 
a necessary level of self-determination for a democratic government. The first category 
includes two state models that are government imposed atheistic secularism, and 
religion controlled by the elected government or semi-democratic constitutional points. 
The second category deals with two other state models which are elected government’s 
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policies subject to veto by non-elected religious officials and theocratic anti-secularism. 
According to definitions of each category, Turkey can be listed under the state model 
that takes place in twin intolerations list. Different secularism models have been applied 
in Turkey at different terms, and it is difficult to put Turkey in one certain category. 
Therefore, Turkey is deeply analyzed as a case study in the following chapter. 
 
Table 2.7: Alfred Stepan’s Twin Toleration Gap (Stepan, 2000) 
 
TWIN TOLERATIONS 
 
(Relatively Stable / Democratic Patterns) 
TWIN INTOLERATIONS 
 
(Relatively Unstable / Nondemocratic 
Patterns) 
 Secular but friendly to religion 
 Non-secular but friendly for 
democracy 
 Sociologically spontaneous 
secularism 
 Unfriendly secularism 
 State Precludes Necessary Degree 
Of Autonomy For Religion In 
Politics 
 The government imposed 
atheistic secularism and religion 
controlled by the elected 
government 
 Elected government's policies 
subject to veto by non-elected 
religious officials and theocratic 
anti-secularism 
 Religious groups preclude a 
necessary degree of autonomy 
for a democratic government 
 
2.2. David Barret’s Model: State Religion 
In his study, Barret analyzes statements about religion in constitutions of states and 
categorizes them to discuss whether they have a state religion or not (Barrett, Kurian, & 
Johnson, 2001). According to his findings, the first categorization draws a line for an 
official state religion and forbids other forms of religion. “Governments sometimes favor 
a designated religion through subsidies and tax collections or through the mandatory 
teaching of religion in public schools. These considerations led Barrett to classify some 
countries as having a “state religion” despite the absence of an official state religion in 
the constitution” (Robert & Rachel, 2005, pp. 2-3). In 2000; Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
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were evaluated as sample cases to the countries who have the Catholic state religion. 
Barret also categorizes some states that have multiple religions, instead of having one 
single state religion such as Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, Philippines, South Africa, 
and Switzerland in 2000 (Barrett, Kurian, & Johnson, 2001). Although Barro and McCleary 
used Barrett’s classification model to measure official state religions, they disagree with 
Barret over classification of some cases. They amended some points of categorization in 
Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson. “They also updated two recent events: Sweden dropping 
Lutheranism as the state religion in 2000 and Bulgaria adopting Orthodoxy as the state 
religion in 2001” (Robert & Rachel, 2005, p. 3). Barro and McCleary argue that there are 
other alternatives to Barret such as ‘Religion and State database’ being aggregated by 
Fox and Sandler. 
 
2.3. Fox and Sandler's Model of Relations of Religion and State 
Fox and Sandler are two of the main researchers who focus on the relation between 
state and religion and make classifications of states according to the dataset that 
evaluates the principle of secularism among the world countries. “World Separation of 
Religion and State in the Twenty-First Century” is their main study that discusses 
secularism models. Their study classifies the relations between state and religion under 
four major groups: “separation of religion and state, discrimination against minority 
religions, restrictions on majority religions, and religious legislation” (Fox & Sandler, 
2004, p. 387). As a comparison between concept of state religion of Barrett and Fox-
Sandler, it argues that there are three main models of religion-state relations: “a country 
has one established religion, or it has multiple established religions (comprising only 
Finland and the United Kingdom in their data), or it has a civil religion, which Fox and 
Sandler view as amounting to an unofficial state religion” (Robert & Rachel, 2005, pp. 2-
3). 
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Table 2.8: Fox and Sandler’s State-Religion Relation Gap (Fox & Sandler, 2004) 
 
World Separation of Religion and State in the Twenty-First Century 
Dataset of Relation Between State and 
Religion 
Models Of Religion-State Relations 
 Separation of religion and state 
 Discrimination against minority 
religions 
 Restrictions on majority religions 
 Religious legislation 
 A country has one established 
religion 
 It has multiple established 
religions (Comprising Only Finland 
and the United Kingdom in Their 
Data) 
 It has a civil religion (unofficial 
state religion) 
 
The study by Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary draw some parallelism between 
Barrett and Fox-Sandler’s researches. Their study covers 188 countries that were 
independent in 2000. “The 188 represent the countries for which we have data on state 
religion and other relevant variables. Among these 188, 40 percent—75 countries—are 
classified as having state religions in 2000. Going back in time, 39 percent of 189 
countries—73—had state religions in 1970, and 59 percent of 188—111—had state 
religions in 1900 (Robert & Rachel, 2005, p. 4)." Their study shows that the rate of state 
religion has decreased in time. 
 
2.4. Veit Bader’s Categorization on Secularism: Religious Pluralism 
Veit Bader’s study discusses religious pluralism in modern states and the difference 
between religious pluralism and secularism in modern states. While it mostly focuses on 
the view of liberal state on religion under religious pluralism, it also analyzes the 
difference between religious pluralism and secularism for modern states. His study 
states that England does not have a separation between church and state on its 
constitution. It gives reference to studies of Policy Studies Institute in London, specifically 
talks about its organization on “Church, State, and Religious Minorities.” Many 
participants from different religions joined the discussion with Liberal Party of England 
to complete disestablishment.  “They questioned whether religious freedom and equal 
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treatment of all religions requires disestablishment and whether political equality 
requires a complete separation between state and (organized) religions or even a 
complete privatization of religion (Bader, 1999, p. 597).” As it shows, although England 
does not have a secular constitution and administrative method, it is accepted as a 
modern Western state. Because of that, social institutions are discussing the place of 
religion in the state system. Secularism is described as a different form; England does 
not have a separation between church and state as it was in other modern Western 
countries but it does not mean that England is a religious state. It has the idea of religious 
pluralism, and it could successfully organize relations of church and state by making 
constitutional arrangements. Therefore, it can be argued that England is a secular state 
that does not exclude religion from the public life and the state system. 
 
The USA is a special case to be discussed on secularism. While it has been evaluated as 
the founder of liberalism; and it is accepted as one of the most democratic and secular 
states in the world, the role of religion in public life is still discussed (Thiemann, 1996, p. 
196). The discussion about the relations between the state and the religion has been 
widened in America.  It “covered not only moral principles and rights but also 
constitutional issues, institutional design, cultures, virtues, practical judgment, and 
policies, the American philosophical debate centers on the legitimate role of religious 
argument in public and/or constitutional discourse in democratic constitutional states 
(Bader, 1999, p. 598).” While the American Enlightenment is seen as an anti-religious 
movement that depends on the radical separation of church and state, it later changed 
shape and transformed into the protection of free exercise of the religion in public life. 
Casanova also argues that America is more religious and less secular than Europe. Yet, 
America has a special form of liberal democracy that protects religious rights. It is also 
not known for European countries where religion begins and secular ends (Casanova, 
2008, pp. 101-109). France and America have positioned in two different sides of the 
secularism. It is argued that France secularism is less functional based on the 
differentiation of state, economy, and science than America; yet, according to Casanova, 
it does not make France less secular than America. 
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2.5. Jose Casanova’s Modelling for Secularism 
Although many authors discuss secularism, it is a well-known misunderstanding that 
secularism is against religion. Jose Casanova also mentions religious and secular 
European States, and he focuses on the importance of religious diversity (Casanova, 
2007, p. 6). Jose Casanova draws a historical perspective to categorize the European 
states according to secularism criteria in his article of Public Religions Revisited 
(Casanova, 2008). Since he believes that secularism is the transformation of Western 
Christianity, it is important to know the state’s historical religious transformation. He 
distinguishes the European countries under three main patterns. The first category 
includes countries that have an established church with the free practice of religion like 
England, Scotland, the Nordic Lutheran countries or Greece. The second category 
contains states that have formal disestablishment of the church and constitutionally 
separate religion and state with radical regulations and control over religion. France is 
the unique European country that has secular principles in its constitution. Lastly, the 
third category consists of the states that have a “formal separation of church and state 
with informal multi-church quasi- establishments. Germany, Holland, Switzerland, the 
remaining Catholic countries and all post-Communist states follow some version of this 
model” (Casanova, 2008, p. 110). 
 
Stepan and Casanova put Catholic Church at another category and argue that each 
branch of Christianity, albeit Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Croatia, officially established in somewhere in Europe (Casanova, 2008). By referencing 
to Stepan, Casanova also stresses the importance of religious pluralism because they 
indicate that strict secular separation of church and state is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition for democracy. He gives reference to Alfred Stepan and his twin 
toleration that is described as “the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must 
somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for 
religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions.” (Stepan, 2000, p. 37) In 
that sense, while they refer to England as the most religiously pluralistic country of 
Western Europe, they argue that Denmark is one of the least religiously pluralistic 
 13 
 
countries in Western Europe. Additionally, it is seen that there is no correlation between 
the level of secularism and religious pluralism because Denmark is one of the most 
secular countries in Europe. Consequently, both scholars argue that strict separation of 
religion and state is not a functioning mechanism to regulate society and stabilize 
democracy and secularism. Instead of applying restrictive religious policies under the 
idea of secularism, it would be better to establish “twin toleration” in modern states.  
Democratic political institutions tolerate religious individuals and groups and also 
support their values in civil society. Nevertheless, religious individuals and groups are 
respectful to democratic rules and adhere to the rule of law.  
 
2.6. Fox’s Separation of Religion and State (SRAS) 
2.6.1. Modeling Based on the State's Constitution 
Jonathan Fox serves some state models based on their constitutions. His study of 
Separation of Religion and State and Secularism in Theory and in Practice (Fox J. , 2011), 
analyzed states that are declared themselves as secular on their constitutions and 
analyzes their constitutional assertions whether they overlap with their practices or not. 
He uses a quantitative methodology in his studies. 
 
In this article, differences in the separation of religion and state in theory and in practice 
were analyzed. According to the article, most of the states declare themselves as 
separationist or secular in their own constitutions. However there is a lack of state 
practice on this case, “the correlation between the presence of an official religion and 
actual state policy can be weak. Cross-country comparative studies often address 
religion constitutions and state religion policy but rarely systematically analyses the 
correlation between two” (Fox J. , 2011, p. 384). In this analysis, a quantitative 
methodology is used by explaining the data between state and religion. In this way, 
research and studies can be comparative to each other in theory and practice.    
 
In these two points, there are two approaches to justify. One of them is separationism; 
another is the secularist-laicist model. In separationism, state policy is designed by 
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neutral attitude but in the secularist-laicist model, “the state has a role to restrict the 
presence of religion in the public sphere” (Fox J. , 2011, p. 385). In that point, Turkey and 
France can be example states to compare secular public sphere.  
 
Table 2.9: Fox’s Approaches to SRAS (Fox J. , 2011) 
 
Approaches about Separation of Religion and State and Secularism in Theory and in 
Practice 
Separationism Secularist-Laicist Model 
 State policy is designed by the 
neutral attitude  
 The state has a role in restricting the 
presence of religion in the public 
sphere (Turkey and France). 
 
This study has three models that design the state’s policies. The first model is absolute 
SRAS, references the state model that neither support nor hinder any religion. “The USA 
as his primary example of this model, arguing that while there is a struggle between 
conservatives and liberals over the exact role religion should play in society and 
government, both sides support the expression of religion in public life” (Ibid, 385). 
 
For Esbeck, “the state may not discriminate among religious groups or prefer religion in 
general over individuals professing no religious beliefs” (Esbeck, 1988, pp. 43-50). 
However, Esbeck emphasizes differences between models and practices. The second 
model is the “neutral political concern, requires that government action should not help 
or hinder any life-plan or way of life more than any other and that the consequences of 
government action should, therefore, be neutral” (Madeley, 2004, pp. 1-22). For Esbeck, 
“This deﬁnition allows governments to support or restrict religion as long as the outcome 
is equal for all religions” (Esbeck, 1988, pp. 43-50). 
 
The third model is the exclusion of ideals. It is that “the state be precluded from justifying 
its actions on the basis of a preference for any particular way of life” (Madeley, 2004, p. 
5). These three models show the roles of states on religion.  
 
 15 
 
Table 2.10: SPRAS Models according to Esbeck and Fox (Esbeck, 1988) 
 
Absolute SRAS Neutral Political Concern Exclusion of Ideals 
 The state neither 
support nor hinder 
any religion (the USA 
is a unique example)  
 Government action 
should not help or 
hinder any life-plan or 
way of life more than 
any other 
 Consequences of 
government action 
should, therefore, be 
neutral 
 The state be precluded 
from justifying its 
actions on the basis of 
a preference for any 
particular way of life 
 
The article includes a part about the data on religion and state relationship, between 
1990-2002 years for 175 states (Fox J. , 2011, pp. 384-401). The data gives details about 
relations of state and religion and argues that these relations are mostly formed by the 
behavior of governments. Apart from the data, “there are various forms of separation of 
state and religion and secularism-laicism; oﬃcial support; oﬃcial hostility; general 
restrictions; religious discrimination; religious regulation; religious legislation; general 
government involvement in religion” (Ibid, 387). In these forms, there are various 
measures and processing. We can also see some tables for operationalizing separation 
of state and religion and secularism-laicism. In these tables, these terms are also 
developed and separated into two or three parts. There are an extended methodology 
and logic of Fox on the formation of these tables. 
 
Reﬂect a fair amount of ambiguities in applying these deﬁnitions and 
include cutoﬀs that are somewhat arbitrary. Unfortunately, an element of 
arbitrariness is unavoidable in this type of exercise. Thus, these ... 
operationalizations are clearly not the only possible ones ...  Nevertheless, 
I argue that these operationalizations meet ... key criteria that make them 
useful and appropriate. First, they represent a good faith attempt to 
operationalize the concepts at hand. Second, they range from the 
relatively strict to the relatively lenient, thus allowing for the testing of a 
broad range of operational deﬁnitions of separation of religion and state. 
In fact, the most lenient of the deﬁnitions arguably allow about as much 
government involvement in religion as any reasonable deﬁnition would 
likely allow and the strictest allows the minimum possible amount of 
 16 
 
separation of religion and state. Third, there are a suﬃciently ﬁnite 
number of operationalizations to make them workable in a study of this 
nature (Fox J. , 2007, pp. 1-25). 
 
It is beneficial to see variables that effect categorization among countries according to 
their state and religion relations in their constitutions.  There are many different 
variables and changeable points of the data that make it hard to thoroughly understand 
the separation between state and religion. However, some separations and 
identifications make the data more understandable. In the article, we can see four 
categories as a result; “secular–laicist states; states declaring SRAS; states whose 
constitutions do not address the issue; states with oﬃcial religions to measure 
constitutional religious policies based six variables” (Fox J. , 2011, p. 391).  
 “Religious Diversity, measured by the Herfindahl methodology, is taken from 
McCleary and Barro” (McClarey & Barro, 2006, pp. 149-175). 
 Religious Identity, each (majority of the country) is “included as a separate 
variable coded as 1 if the majority belongs to the relevant religion” (Fox J. , 2011, 
p. 391). 
 Population, “growth in numbers of people can create scarcity – a shortfall 
between what people need and want and what they have. Under this pressure, 
governments may ... resort to repression as a coping mechanism” (Henderson, 
1993, pp. 322-333). 
 Regime 
 Stability  
 Economic Development  
  
 17 
 
Table 2.11: Four Categories of Fox to Measure Constitutional Religious Policies of States 
(Fox J. , 2011) 
 
 Secular–Laicist 
States 
States 
Declaring 
SRAS 
States Whose 
Constitutions 
Do Not 
Address The 
Issue 
States with 
Oﬃcial 
Religions 
 
Religious 
Diversity 
    
Religious 
Identity 
    
Population     
Regime     
Stability     
Economic 
Development 
    
 
The article discuss 14 countries that are claim  themselves as secular in their 
constitutions but that are not entirely secular in practice. These countries are listed as 
follows:  
 
Azerbaijan, the Turkish government of Cyprus, France, Guinea, India, the Ivory 
Coast, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Mali, Russia, Senegal, Togo, Turkey, and 
Turkmenistan. 11 of the 13 states which declare themselves secular and meet the 
secularism–laicism standard are located in sub-Saharan Africa that are Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Gambia, 
Mozambique, Namibia, and Zaire. The other two are Guyana and Kyrgyzstan (Fox 
J. , 2011, p. 395).  
 
These features are mostly seen in East and African countries.  “However, the RAS dataset 
shows no regulation of Catholicism in France. Rather, much of the religious legislation in 
France involves the continuation of historical practices that predate the current regime 
of laicism–secularism and harassment of religions that are considered to be non-
indigenous to France” (Fox J. , 2008, pp. 135-136). While Turkey and France have been 
evaluated as secularist-laicist countries; Germany, Italy, and Spain are categorized as 
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separatist countries. Bugaric argues that “even democracies can fall short of their 
constitutional principles if they lack independent media, a strong independent judiciary, 
a politically neutral and professional civil service, protections for minority political 
parties, and both a willingness and mechanism to ﬁght corruption” (Bugaric, 2008, pp. 
191-203).  
 
It is clear that scholars analyzed models of states policies on separation of state and 
religion and looked for how states govern this process in theory and practice. As a result, 
differences exist in theory and practice according to the data and analyses. It  linked with 
specific and constitutional reasons on the following. However, there are also 
independent factors for these cases.  
 
2.6.2. Democracy Based Categorization for Secularism 
The study of Fox by the name of “Do Democracies Have Separation of Religion and 
State?” has a crucial position in the literature to analyze the relationship between 
democracy and secularization. While the study indicates variables and measurements on 
states’ secularization models, it claims and proofs that even the democracy is the major 
necessity to establish a secular state system, not all democracies have a secular model; 
democracy is not a single-handed condition to structure secularism on a state.  
 
In order to measure the level of state and religion separation, Fox uses a design that 
includes seven separate operationalizations of SRAS based on four different definitions 
of SRAS.  In this research, Fox uses countries and their theoretical and practical policies 
about separation of religion and state. The data that was taken from Freedom House and 
Polity datasets were used in the article. 
 
SRAS is assumed as a norm of liberal democracy. Two main reasons prioritize SRAS for 
liberal democracies. As norms of liberal democracy, it gives importance to minority rights 
and its links. Another norm is related to the historical background of the modern 
Western countries and threat of the potential tyranny of religious majorities on those. 
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There are also many approaches and thoughts on liberal democracy’s role on SRAS. 
“Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow 
them to mandate public policy to democratically elected governments. At the same time, 
individuals and religious communities ... must have complete freedom to worship 
privately” (Shah, Stepan, & Toft, 2012, p. 57). 
 
However, there are many different variables and ideas about democracy. “Many authors 
posit that democracy is not possible in religiously plural societies” (Mill, 1951).  "The 
literature on consociationalism and power-sharing reflects this by implicitly arguing that 
heterogeneous societies can only maintain democracy through complex power-sharing 
arrangements” (Fox J. , 2018).  As a different approach; “there are numerous examples 
of religion and democracy coexisting, including the existence of established churches in 
several Western European states and widespread government support in Europe for 
religion, especially religious education” (Stepan, 2000, pp. 37-56) . There are also some 
examples that linked with countries such as Anthony Smith argues that “many particular 
nationalist ideologies in democratic states like France, Greece, Ireland, the US and the 
UK to religious origins. Research suggests that when there is a strategic interest in doing 
so, religious groups often support democracy” (Fox J. , 2007, p. 4). “Mazie arguing that 
some elements of religion are compatible with democracy, while others are not” (Mazie, 
2004, pp. 3-12). 
 
It is seen that there are many approaches that accept or do not accept SRAS. For some, 
religion and state are instruments that cannot exist together. For some, they can coexist 
and follow each other. Modernization and secularization theory pays attention to 
modernist discourses and rationalist process of governing. “The popularity of this body 
of theory has been waning of late and is countered by an emerging literature which 
argues that rather than causing religion’s demise, modernization has brought about its 
resurgence” (Appleby, 2000). However, there are also some different ideas against 
elements of liberalism and modernism as Bruce defends that “individualism, diversity, 
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and egalitarianism in the context of liberal democracy” has led to a “long-term decline 
in the power, popularity, and prestige of religious beliefs and rituals” (Bruce, 2002). 
 
2.6.3. Secularism Modeling over Relations of Religion and State 
Fox has used RAS dataset to measure SRAS and it, in fact, measures government 
involvement in religion for the first time (GIR). “Dataset focus on the behavior of 
governments, not general societal practices. There are seven RAS variables used; official 
support, official hostility, general restrictions, religious discrimination, religious 
regulation, religious legislation, general GIR” (Fox J. , 2007, p. 5). 
 
According to Fox, if secularization theory were correct, one would expect to see that 
more economically developed countries are, the lesser GIR they have. According to the 
data shown in Table 2.6,  
 
Most democratic states do not have SRAS but on the other hand, 
democracies tend to have less GIR than non-democracies. Using the 
results for general GIR in 2002, the democratic states that come the 
closest to being religious states are Israel (general GIR = 36.84), Greece 
(general GIR = 33.31), Finland (general GIR = 32.88) and Costa Rica 
(general GIR = 31.61). While the governments of these states are 
substantially involved in religious matters, there is no comparison 
between them and the more autocratic states, which score much higher 
on the general GIR measure, such as Saudi Arabia (77.56), Iran (66.59), 
Egypt (62.92) and Jordan (60.51) (Fox J. , 2007, p. 18) 
 
 
Table 2.12: Fox’s Measurement of Democracies by RAS Measures between 1990 and 
2002 (Fox J. , 2007, p. 18). 
 
 Official 
Support 
Official 
Hostility 
General 
Restrictions 
Religious 
Discrimination 
Religious 
Regulation 
Religious 
Legislation 
Polity 1990 Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Greece 
Norway 
Sweden 
Uruguay Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
Hungary 
Spain 
Austria 
Germany 
Greece 
Switzerland 
Costa Rica 
Portugal 
Greece 
Sweden 
UK 
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Table 2.13 (Continued) 
 
Polity 2002  Uruguay Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
Hungary 
Spain 
Austria 
Germany 
Switzerland 
Mongolia Israel 
 
Freedom 
House 1990 
 France Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
Pakistan 
Spain 
Pakistan Costa Rica 
Portugal 
Pakistan 
 
Freedom 
House 2002 
 France 
Uruguay 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Hungary 
Austria  
Germany  
France  
Switzerland 
Slovenia 
Costa Rica 
Portugal 
Panama 
Belgium 
UK 
 
W. 
Democracies 
 1990 
 France Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
 Spain 
Austria 
Germany 
Greece 
Switzerland 
Portugal Greece 
Sweden 
UK 
 
W. 
Democracies 
2002 
 France Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
Spain 
France 
 Portugal Belgium 
UK 
 
In Table 2.6, there are different results in practice that are different in theory. In the 
article, there are many arguments that are related to secularism and modernism, and 
these terms are related to liberal democracies. Yet according to the data, there are 
exceptions on liberal democratic states in terms of applying SRAS. Apart from the US, 
there is no state, has absolute SRAS. However, some states are involved in religious 
matters. Apart from these, the highest score of general GIR variable belongs to states 
that have Muslim majorities. 21 states of top 25 high score countries have the Muslim 
majority.   
 
As a result, it is clear that democracy and SRAS are not an indivisible whole. In the 
literature, there are many conceptualization approaches that support or criticize the 
rest. But all of them have a lack of practicality and difficulties in application to the real 
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word problems on secularism. Western countries that are governed by liberal 
democracies have no system that is entirely far away from religion and religious 
institutions. Especially, states might have to pose a political agenda on religion via a 
number of regulations even if they do not tend to prefer it. The measures of GIR shows 
which countries have tenser relations with religion. At that point, it can be identified that 
states that have a Muslim majority tend to have more inclusive relations. However, 
finding a state that has no involvement in religious affairs, is almost impossible according 
to the article and the data.  Consequently, a total separation of religion and state can be 
found in the constitutions and it can be a motivation for state’s ruling, however, 
according to SRAS, it is not possible in practice.  
 
To conclude, the world literature has focused on the criteria of secularism and has found 
different sources and modes of secularism on the states that are known as democratic 
and secular. Different quantitative and qualitative methods have used to measure levels 
and kinds of secularism. Yet it would not be ignored that every state has its own social, 
cultural and political qualities that affect the way of secularism.   
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CHAPTER 3  
SECULARISM IN TURKEY 
 
Secularism is one of the most controversial topics in Turkish politics since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in terms of its definition and limitations over 
religion. Although secularism is protected by the constitution, application of secularism 
has changed with the policies of the governing political party at different terms.  While 
the Turkish state has experienced more strict and repressive models of secularism in the 
Single Party Era (1923-1950), it has moved to a softer version in practice with Democrat 
Party starting from 1950. Military coups also have a crucial place in the history of Turkish 
democracy, and they had affected relations between democracy and secularism. Yet, the 
era that began with the AK Party also has different importance on Turkish politics. While 
the understanding of secularism is not clear even in today, it would not be wrong to 
argue that practices of secularism have changed at AK Party term. Here secularism in 
Turkey can be divided into three main terms. The first term was under the control of one 
party system that can be called as dismissive secularism. The second term was designed 
with conservative right parties which offered soft secular policies. As the last step, it has 
been concluded with AK Party term that was considered as regulative secularism which 
means as a form of secularism that aimed to regulate the relation between secular state 
and religious and non-religious people. 
 
3.1.      History of Secularism in Turkey 
Secularism has been used as a tool of social structure to re-shape Turkish society after 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Early republicans have accepted Western values 
as inevitable to build a new state. Modernism and secularism were seen as major values 
for the new Turkey. These values were more related to the social structure rather than 
institutional or governmental structure because it is believed that rebuilding Turkish 
society under Western values is the guarantor of having a stable and independent state. 
“In an attempt to establish a new sense of nationhood and a new social order, the 
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Kemalist project took secularism, progress and Western modernity as the founding 
principles of its ideology” (Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p. 226). Because of that secularism was 
applied by the hand of government as a top-down policy. The problem is not the ideal of 
secularism itself; understanding of secularism was problematical for the majority of the 
society. Secularism was evaluated as a division between religion and state not just on 
the ground of the official part of the life, but it was tried to apply in daily life as a 
separatist power from religion. Islamic context secularism is defined as “the acceptance 
of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam” (Rahman, 
1970, p. 331). 
 
The importance of secularism is mostly related to its link to democracy. Secularism and 
modernism are seen as inseparable elements of democratic states. Yet, in the early years 
of the Turkish Republic, secularism just brought the state’s radical control over religion, 
not a regulation between religion and state. Social and political reforms were main 
indicators of Turkey’s secularization models. “The secularizing reforms, such as the 
abolition of religious colleges and high schools (medrese) and the creation of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) all helped the new regime place religion and its 
expression under its own control” (Burak, 2012, p. 66). Ironically, according to governing 
political party, all reforms were necessary to establish a “democratic” governing, even 
they were applied by force to the citizens. 
 
Nurullah Ardıç indicates that “Influenced by the “modernization theory” that was 
dominant in the mid-20th century (see Lerner 1958) as well as nationalist secularism, or 
“Kemalism,” of most post-colonial regimes in the Middle East, this paradigm conceives 
of Islam and modernity as incompatible with, and even the opposite of, each other” 
(Ardıç, 2012, p. 16).  As a result of this, Kemalist secularism gained the role of 
guardianship of modernism and secularism were the key instrument to structure 
Western modernism even its model was so strict and repressive over the religion.  
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While secularism is coded as most defining characteristic of the Kemalist reform 
movement by Zurcher (Zurcher, 2003, p. 186), it is evaluated as being a core prerequisite 
in the constitution of a stable democracy by Stepan (Stepan, 2000, pp. 37-57). Although 
secularism is considered a precondition of democracy, separation between religion and 
state did not bring democracy always, as it is seen in Turkish case. Republican People’s 
Party managed the state according to their own political truths and did not abstain from 
forcing people if their truths have clashed with citizens' beliefs, ideas, and values. So, it 
is clearly seen that even early republicans believed the necessity of secularism to 
establish a stable democracy in Turkey, on the contrary, it led to damage of democracy 
at that term.   
 
By the looking at reforms and applications of Kemalist secularization at Single Party Era, 
it is arguing that Kemalist secularization is non-democratic and authoritarian. The Turkish 
government has used a top-down oppressive method over citizens, and its secularization 
method did not just offer a division between religion and state; it also brought strict 
control and restriction over religion. As analyzed in the first chapter, Islam and 
democracy were evaluated as opposite to each other, and it is always discussed whether 
democracy and Islam can coexist or not. It is not surprising that Western authors such as 
Huntington argues democracy and Islam cannot coexist; early republican elites also 
behaved in the same direction with Huntington, and they aimed to limit and abolish 
religious practices not only in the public sphere but in every part of the life. Kemalism as 
a unique political ideology of that term “moved Turkey closer to the West culturally while 
moving it further from Western democratic practice. Like the CUP leadership of 1913-
1918, he preferred strengthening the state rather than the constitution or the electoral 
system” (Findley, 2010, p. 252). Turkey’s secularism is closed to French model in this 
sense because Kemalist elites evaluated assertive French laicism as the most competent 
version of secularism and applied this non-democratic model (Parla & Davison, 2008, pp. 
58-75). 
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Talad Asad also suggested that Turkey evaluated French model secularism as a role 
model for themselves at single party era because centralized state control was the main 
director of the Turkish policy. According to Asad, “the preoccupation with unity has been 
a central feature of authoritarian discourse and the requirement of loyalty to symbols of 
the nation is central to that political tradition… Those who are to be unified or integrated 
are required to submit to a particular normative order” (Asad, 2006, p. 496). The 
normative order that he mentioned on the stage was the secularism in Turkey. The aim 
of the secularism that was applied by Kemalist elites was the transporting religion to the 
private sphere rather than public area. “Islamic authority under the full and absolute 
control of the secular state… The institutionalization of secularism involved bringing all 
religious activity under the direct control and monopoly of the secular state” (Çınar A. , 
2005, p. 16). To structure a modernized and secular Turkish society, many reforms have 
been adopted until the 1950s; many of them directly aimed to change the visibility of 
the individuals in terms of way of dressing. The reforms also tended to force people in 
the same way of practicing of religion. 
 
3.2.      Secular but non-Democratic Reforms of the Single Party Era 
After the establishment of Kemalist secular Turkish Republic early Republic elites first 
designed to society according to their Western ideal. The announcement of democracy 
did not accept sufficient to build a new state. In order to create a Western, democratic 
and secular state it was necessary to reform society; not just institutional parts of the 
state. “Dominant paradigms in the historiography of Turkish modernization stand as 
formidable obstacles in understanding and analyzing the reactions to Kemalist 
modernization that have a top-to-down authoritarian character that aimed at 
modernizing and westernizing Turkish society by implementing legal reforms.” (Çağlar, 
2015, p. 2) French laicism was taken as a model for Turkish secularism, but French laicism 
was defined as a non-religious government control over citizens, and because of that it 
is seen as impossible to build a secular state in Turkey (Parla & Davison, 2008, pp. 58-
75). 
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While Kemalist reforms were designed to change the structure of the Turkish society and 
to create a new national identity, the state had played a role as a unique control 
mechanism to impose its values. The state used force to citizens who tended to reject 
Western reforms more than engrain in these values. “The basis of the Kemalist religious 
policy was laicism, not irreligion; its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to re-establish 
it—to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, 
and limit it to matters of belief and worship” (Lewis, 2002, p. 412). 
 
Secular state ideal included control of the state religion; it did not aim abandon religion 
entirely even Caliphate was abandoned on 3 March 1924. Turning “Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Pious Foundations into two separate Directorates: the General Directorate of 
Pious Foundations, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the separated financial link 
between the Pious Foundations and Religious Affairs” (Köker, 2010, p. 32). On the one 
hand, the religious ministry’s status  descended from cabinet ministry, and it is suitable 
for the aim of secularization, on the other hand, the budget of Directorate of Religious 
Affairs was organized by Prime Ministry.  
 
Constitutional reforms were the major tool to guarantee the establishment of the secular 
state in Turkey. Article 2 that is saying “the religion of the state is Islam” (Assembly T. G., 
1945) was changed as depend on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s demand on 10 April 1928. 
After redesigning the constitution according to “article 16, Assembly would no longer 
open after Friday prayers with sermons, and deputies would be sworn in on a man’s 
honor, not in the name of Allah” (Morrison, 1935, pp. 453-454). Moreover, religious 
references dropped from military and judicial staffs in the criminal courts; just civil courts 
had continued to require to swear in the name of God and honor (Jaschke, 1972). 
Secularization process penetrated to all segments of society, and it reduced the use of 
the name of “God” in social and practical parts of the life. Kemalist reforms designed the 
political structure and then focused on the most visible part of the society such as 
education, clothing, law, civil law.  
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“Fortunately, these first attempts to challenge political history and its binary oppositions 
continued with scholars of Turkish modernization focusing on the daily life and agency 
of ordinary people. A limited number of scholars from different academic disciplines 
focused on particular aspects of the social history of Turkish modernization” (Çağlar, 
2015, p. 2). Polygamy was forbidden by the reforms in the judicial system. Turkey 
accepted the Swiss civil code on 17 February 1926. According to Niyazi Berkes removing 
the article that is saying “state religion is Islam” on 10 April 1928 and putting the principle 
of laicism to the constitution to protect a secular way of governing in 1937 were some 
of the most important steps on the way of secularization in Turkey (Berkes, 1964). 
 
Reforms in the area of education were not just with the style of education; it was also 
the case that mentality needed to be revised to a more modern, Western and secular 
sense. Hence, Law on the Unification of Education, issued 3rd of the March in 1924, draw 
the state’s control mechanism over education. It did not just abolish religious education 
and madrasahs, it also standardized the context of the education and secularized it. Even 
madrasahs did not just give religious education after all madrasahs were closed, optional 
religious classes were forbidden in 1931 (Gelovani, 2011, p. 38). “The centuries-old 
Medrese of Süleymaniye, the Al-Azhar of Turkey, was turned into a Faculty of Religion 
under the state-governed İstanbul University with a revised curriculum centered on 
philosophy, psychology and matters of antiquarian interest, rather than on Islamic 
theology, offering fewer old Islamic courses taught in Arabic and Persian, more science 
courses with less emphasis on religion, and no language requirement.” (Köker, 2010, p. 
33) 
 
Reunification of education system did not just dominate medreses, and it also served 
other classes to drive young generations to become a secular and modern generation. 
For this, the Turkish Republic’s modern schools give compulsory History of Atatürk’s 
Principles and Reforms classes from primary school up to university years. Education and 
rituals such as reading our national oath before the class on the school were used as a 
method to imposed Kemalist reforms, values and religion style (Meşeci, 2007). 
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Another abolition came to tekkes and türbes in Turkey on 30 November 1925. All tekkes 
and türbes were closed, but it did not lead to disappear of them, just motivated tekkes 
and religious communities settled themselves as underground organizations (Eric, 1993, 
p. 200). Apart from mescids and camiis, tekkes had a special place to Turkish society in 
terms of doing religious practices with together people who behave the same way. It 
evaluated as a way of religious pluralism within society until face with authoritarian 
secular regulations.  
 
Secular ideology focused on the visible part of the life, and because of that it also aimed 
to change the way of dressing of the citizens. “Hat law” is the clearest sign of the ideal 
of the secularization of the way of dressing. After “hat law” was accepted on 25 
November 1925, it was forbidden to use “fez” because it is accepted that fez was the 
symbol of traditional and religious Ottoman people. Yet, it was not easy to change the 
habits and beliefs of the people, and many people gave reaction to forbidden of the fez 
and rejected to use “hat” as a compulsory rule. “The government viewed them as 
organized reactionary movements and adopted severe measures to crush them. 
Although the maximum penalty to wear a fez was a month in prison, the Independence 
Tribunal sentenced 18 people to death 112 for exploiting religion for political purposes” 
(Köker, 2010, p. 34). As it is seen in the practice of the reforms, Kemalist secularism was 
an authoritarian form of the secularism and forced people to live in conformity with its 
ideals. 
 
Kemalist reforms to decrease the influence of Islam in the public sphere continued with 
the change in clock and calendar in 1926. The reason to change clock and calendar was 
shown to have parallelism with developed Western countries because Turkey aimed to 
build stronger relations with them. While Islamic clock was organized according to prayer 
times, the modern clock did not include an Islamic reference in it. “The adoption of 
Western numerals in 1928 and of Western weights and measures in 1931 in place of 
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Arabic equivalents and the introduction of family names in 1934 further de-Islamized the 
Turkish society while infusing a heavy dose of Western modernity (Ibid, p. 37).” 
 
One of the most effective reform to change Turkish people a general way of life and link 
with its traditional and religious history was the acceptance of Latin alphabet on 1 
November 1928. After parliament accepts the Latin alphabet as official methods of the 
communication, the Arabic alphabet was forbidden and did not accept on the state 
staffs. According to Zürcher, it was “another way to cut off Turkish society from its 
Ottoman and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions and reorientate it towards the West” 
(Zurcher, 2003, p. 197) or it was interpreted as a symbol of preference to be with the 
Western world rather than the Arab world (Çitak, 2004).  
 
As many authors and politicians indicate, the alphabet reform was not just about the 
letters or education; it was also a reform to build a new history and belonging for Turkish 
people. “Sun Language Theory” was also interpreted at the same terms. According to 
this theory, every language has proceeded from the Turkish language which in turn is an 
ancient Central Asian language (Findley, 2010, p. 255). A new alphabet was used to build 
a new language and national identity in fact. Because Kemalist elites first have aimed to 
create a new national identity, they focused on to cut link of society from their past. 
Turkish history thesis was also produced according to the same ideal. 
 
Secularization and Westernization trends spread countrywide by legal reform as a new 
worldview and lifestyle and structure of the society was shifted from traditional Islamic 
version and lifestyle (Gürbey, 2012, p. 5). Kemalist reforms first aimed to reach the 
development level of modern, secular Western countries and because of that designed 
the reform steps on the ground of secularization. Yet, it was not enough to change the 
way of life of society. Kemalist secularism was authoritarian, and it had tried to organize 
every part of the life such as deciding the ideal type of music or clothing for the citizens. 
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Secularism has settled on the constitution as a frame of new Turkish government on the 
definition of separate religious and state affairs from each other. However, secular 
policies led people who wish to live with religious and traditional values on the public 
sphere had faced with pressure and punishment. State’s authoritarian policies force 
people to organize a religious life as an underground mechanism, or some authors or 
elites had preferred leave the county such as Mehmet Akif. “As a product of this 
secularized public discourse, Kemalist secularism rooted among the new generations, 
especially solidifying itself within the rising Kemalist elite, including the military, and 
slowly creating of a substantial group of secularist activists sworn to protect the Kemalist 
legacy at any cost” (Köker, 2010, p. 40). 
 
Although Islam had faced severe state pressure and even state had aimed to dominate 
public religious practices it had to succeed to protect itself. As James Scot’s premise Islam 
has built up its structure as a hidden transcript in daily life as a reaction to Kemalist 
reforms (Scott, 1990). Therefore, because Islam did not lose its importance on the life of 
the majority of the society, after secular Republican People’s Party, Democrat Party that 
had religious items in itself had gained high support from citizens who evaluate 
Democrat Party as an alternative to secular PDP after 1946. Secularism and religion are 
always seen as opposite sides of the state system, and all political parties who has even 
little Islamic references were evaluated as a threat against the secular state system. The 
military coup against Democrat Party had based on the protection of secular order in 
Turkey while the 1960 and 1980 military coup had grounded on the same reason. While 
secularism is part of the way of governing the state, it turned to the main value of the 
state which should protect from every threat. Turkish government mostly had the vision 
that is “despite the public, for the public” as a result of authoritarian secularism model. 
 
3.3.      Second Term of Turkish Secularism  
Secularism in Turkey has transformed to a phase from an oppressive model of Kemalists 
with Democrat Party. Democrats were known as a group of people who has conservative 
values that differ them from Republicans. The most important thing is that the Democrat 
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party was aware of secularism problem within the society and thanks to Democrat 
Party’s commitment to solving issues resulted from secularism principle was put them 
into power. So, softened Kemalist secular policies was most important contribution of 
DP to the Turkish democracy. Turkish secularism also experienced a different form of 
secularism even it was not perfect from until it destroyed with a military coup. 
 
Religious education that was applied by control of the state on the schools was one of 
the main debatable topics on state’s secularism. As it recorded, there was a high increase 
in the imam-hatip schools and they allowed all Muslim children to receive religious 
education in public schools even in secondary schools (Daver, 1988). Another effective 
reform that was very well received by big part of the society that turning call of prayer 
into Arabic version instead of Turkish translation. The prayer had turned to call in Turkish 
by order of Ismet Inonu.  
 
While a few Kemalist elites have evaluated these reforms as an obstacle for stabilizing 
secularism in Turkey, they can be seen as a way of freedom of religious expression in the 
society. While official reforms had evaluated to broaden expression of religion on public 
life, there were also other social and practical effects of Democrat’s softer secularist 
understanding. For instance, it is hard to be a coincidence that tarikats and tekkes were 
started to reborn even as an underground project after the 1950s. As it is recorded 
religion on social life also found more space. For instance, 
 
Ramadan began to be celebrated more publicly. Religious publications 
reappeared. The remnants of various mystical orders (tarikats) began 
tentatively to show their heads. During this period a large number of 
government funds was used for building new mosques in cities, towns, 
and villages. One estimated that some five thousand mosques were built 
between 1950 and 1960 (Daver, 1988, p. 33).   
 
The opening of new mosques occurred in the same period with the construction of new 
public schools and Frederic Frey says “This silent struggle for scarce resources seems 
highly symbolic of the greater struggle for scarce resources seems highly symbolic of the 
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greater struggle between the forces of secularism and Islam in Turkey” (Frey, 1965, p. 
390).  
 
While a détente period has started with Democrat Party after hard and dismissive 
secularist policies of Kemalists, the duration had faced with a break with the military 
coup at 27th May 1960. Because the Turkish military was opposed to Democrats' 
governmental policies and found their way of governing against the idea of the secular 
Turkish state, they had seized the control of the state. 
 
3.4.       Break for the Democracy for the Sake of Secularism 
3.4.1. 27th May 1960 Military Coup  
The military has always been a crucial actor in the political life of the Turkish state. Most 
of the time military located itself as guarantor of secularism and because of that, it found 
the right to interfere in political life whenever danger was detected according to the 
military. In that sense, it was not a surprise that military found guilty Democrat Party 
because secularism was under danger because of their policies.  One of the most 
important results of the coup was the change of the constitution in 1961. 
 
Existing constitution already draw a line for secularism in itself by the article two that is 
saying “The Turkish Republic is a national, democratic, secular and social state” 
(Assembly T. G., 2009). Constitution was evaluated as a tool to secure the secular form 
of the Turkish Republic and the 1961 Constitution strengthened this idea by article 19 
that is an openly ended point. The article says “no person shall be allowed to exploit and 
abuse religion or religious feelings or sacred things in any manner whatsoever for 
political or personal benefit or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the 
fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religious grounds” 
(Assembly T. G., 2009). In a manner, while the article seems to rule to make a division 
between religion and state affairs in another manner, it did not directly draw a limited 
space for control of state on the religious issues. As a result of this, Turkey has struggled 
with issues based on secularism for many years.  
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Although the 1961 constitution was organized under fear of Democrats’ penalty, 
Democrat Party term is recognized as a period against Kemalist reforms. Especially the 
Republican People Party insisted that Democrat Party targeted secular principles with 
Islamist speeches.  “The pertinent fact is that the Democrat Party and the Republican 
People's Party interpreted secularism an ever going issue. It was mixed with other issues 
and served to add fuel to the fire which will continue to smolder” (Weiker, 1973, p. 9). 
In fact, if someone looks at the activities of the Democrat Party between 1950 and 1960, 
it is clear that they realized modern political and economic activities and reforms. Even 
their political and economic activities had a modern structure, Democrat Party’s 
approach to secularism and modernization is different from Kemalist elites, and because 
of that Democrat Party found guilty by the claim of being against Turkish secularism. 
While Kemalist elites’ secularism understanding refers excluding religion from public 
sphere Democrat Party’s secularism model was softer and more inclusive for religious 
practices. 
 
It is not a minor change for the Turkish society that the reciting the azan in Arabic version 
again after Ismet Inonu turned the ezan in Turkish form. There are different versions of 
comments about Atatürk’s secularism model. For instance, according to Kemal Karpat 
who is one of the main historians and academics in Turkey says secularism, not just a 
political tool to distinguish between religion and political life. It also a liberation way of 
Turkish people from the press of Islam. He describes Atatürk’s secularism as the 
“nationalist, positivist, scientific minded, anti-traditionalist, anticlerical secularism” 
(Karpat, 2015, p. 272). 
 
3.4.2. 1980 Military Intervention 
As it turned to Turkish political tradition, the army was put itself to the guardianship of 
Turkish secularism on 12 September 1980 and intervened to the democracy again. The 
main reason for the coup for its supporters was to secure Turkey from destructive forces 
and safe Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s principles. Secularism was the main principle that the 
army tended to secure. Secularism was applied as a strong top-down policy toward 
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Turkish society for a long-term, and Islamic discourses were pressed until the late 1980s. 
Yet, it could be seen that Islamic discourses and expression of religion in the public realm 
has widened in that term. Religious people had started to refuse authority and control 
mechanism of military and state over their Islamic practices. It could be seen that Islamic 
discourses have clashed with secularism after the 1980s and there was a noticeable 
increase in the visibility of religious matters within the public and private sphere of the 
life. By taking into account all of these developments the military again pushed the fear 
of “sharia,” and they found the right on themselves to legitimize the 1980 military coup. 
 
After the military coup to “save the secular principle of the Turkish Republic,” the new 
constitution was accepted in 1982 to reflect general attitudes of the army toward 
secularism and its regulation over the society. Secularism again was utilized as a control 
mechanism over Turkish society. Article 24 of the 1982 constitution clearly reflect how 
the army evaluated secularism as a control mechanism that design people’s relations 
with religion;  
 
Education and instruction in religion and ethics (morals) shall be 
conducted under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious 
culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of 
primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction 
shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and the in case of minors, 
at the request of their legal representatives (Constitution of the Republic 
of Turkey, 1982, s. article 24). 
 
Turkey’s secularism has never abolished religion in the history; on the contrary, it holds 
the religion as a pragmatic tool to create an ideal society. Because Republican elites first 
tented to reach a modernized society, they saw secularism as a key figure to transform 
society, and because of that, French-style dismissive secularism was applied until the 
1990s. Yet, the army has opened a broader scope to the religion that never seen before. 
As it is seen in the article 24, religious courses have been compulsory in the schools. 
Turkish military accepted religion as an antidote to other dangers, especially for the 
danger of communism. Because there was a rising trend toward university students and 
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younger people toward communism under sympathy to Russia, the Turkish army aimed 
to force young generation to be “native” and “national.” Religion was an effective way 
to consolidate society and state relation with religion again constructed in a pragmatic 
way under the principle of secularism by the army intervention. 
 
Kemalism evaluated religion as a total moral system that affects the political and social 
attitudes of the people rather than just a belief system (Parla & Davison, 2008, pp. 58-
75).  Because of that, the state found the right to decrease the scope of religion to the 
private area under individual conscience (Mardin Ş. , 2012). Kemalism was found control 
of religion useful and pragmatic in creating a “Turkish nation.” After the first part of the 
Turkish Republic under one party rule, Turkish secularism adopted a more liberal line but 
did not totally offer a free political atmosphere for the believers in the public space. 
Moreover, in contrast to political parties’ intervention to break walls between religion 
and state especially with rising of right-conservative political parties, the military 
interventions again stabilized a “supreme control of the state” over relations of religion 
and the state. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Votes shared by political parties in Turkey (Tepe, 2008, p. 284)  
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As the history shows, the army in Turkey has historically appeared as a guardian of 
Kemalism. They decided to be ideal Muslim in Turkey and people who have received 
religious education, who wear a headscarf, whose mother wears a headscarf, who has a 
beard, or even whose father has a beard, are not reflect ideal form of citizen and because 
of that they could not join the army as an officer. On the one hand, the army tried to 
draw a “favorable” citizen model for the individuals by stressing the lines of secularism, 
on the other hand, they tried to save links of citizens with religion because they believe 
religion is a good reason to consolidate public. Because of that after the coup attempts, 
the military reorganized the constitution and added new articles to give religious 
education by the hand of the state in 1982. So, even Turkey’s right conservative parties 
have been affected to change the assertive structure of secularism, interventions of the 
Turkish military had partly prevented it. 
 
3.4.3. 28 February 1997 Post Modern Coup 
1980 military coup did not offer a solution to the “issue of secularism” addressed by the 
military. On the contrary, the visibility of issues raised by religious demands turned out 
to be more visible and important for many people. Of course, the Refah Party has a big 
impact on vocalized religious demands. One of the main problems that were born 
because of the clash between assertive secularism and religion was the headscarf issue. 
Refah Party problematize headscarf as a political matter under its Islamic identity. “The 
enormous electoral success of the Refah Party in the 1994 local elections can be 
regarded as a turning point in the history of Turkey insofar as the unchallenged 
continuance of Kemalist secular ideology is concerned” (Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p. 229).  
 
The Turkish military continued its interventions to the democracy on 28 February 1997 
under the guardianship of Turkish secularism. The model to be a “persona grata” for the 
secular Turkish state did not change at that time. Many military officers and civil 
bureaucrats who pray, do not drink alcohol, have a wife who wears a headscarf, that was 
accepted necessities of a secular lifestyle were expelled from the military. One more time 
the Turkish military has aimed to be the guarantor of Turkish modernization and 
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secularism by force. “This mission turned the army into the political symbol of 
nationhood and the instrument of preserving the nation… The armed forces have always 
occupied a special position in Turkey… The armed forces continued to think of 
themselves as the guardians of secular, reformist, and democratic goals (Momayezi, 
1998, pp. 3-4).” 
 
One of the most important implementations of the 28 February for the religious part of 
the society was the headscarf ban. Thousands of women could not complete their 
education or could not start to university education for more than 10 years that many 
people who were qualified as being “internal enemies” by state elites.  
 
Over the course of time, this issue has become a central point of concern 
within the debate of secularism and its role in Turkey. Some find the ban 
on headscarves to be incompatible with secularism while others would 
disagree. Apart from this, in the past, the entire bureaucratic system was 
dominated by people who held a strict secular understanding and 
lifestyle. It is normal now, however, to see someone in the bureaucracy 
whose wife wears a headscarf (Burak, 2012, p. 75). 
 
Another problem occurred by the 28 February postmodern coup was related with the 
Imam-Hatip schools. The military regulated the education system and turned it into a 
more “secure form” according to its own criteria. First, eight-year education became 
compulsory, and then the new system applied a special scoring system that made really 
hard entering university except for the theology department for Imam-Hatip students. 
“When the February 28 coup occurred, in the 1996-1997 academic year, the Imam-Hatip 
schools were at their peak with 511,502 students.  As a result of these two particular 
policies, the number of students at these schools decreased to 64,534 in the 2002-2003 
academic year.” (Kuru, 2006, p. 19) Most of Quran courses were also closed because 
they were seen as the instrument of political Islam and the age limit was applied to the 
student who joined the courses.  
 
 39 
 
After the 28 February process, Islamic groups demonstrated a strong resistance to the 
policies dictated by the military that aimed to fasten religion to an individual line. These 
center-right groups seek for the liberalized state from military stress, and they started to 
support EU process as an anti-thesis of the military. “For the first time, these pro-state, 
center-right Muslim groups asked hard questions about the legitimacy of the Turkish 
military… As a result, the biggest loser of the February 28 coup has been the military 
itself. It succeeded in removing the democratically elected government, but it has never 
regained its former credibility in the eyes of the center-right” (Yavuz, 2009, p. 16). Refah 
Party had become the most powerful party in the local elections under Necmettin 
Erbakan leadership.  Unfortunately, the intervention of the army was a tradition of 
Turkish democracy, and Necmettin Erbakan was seen as a danger for Turkish secularism 
yet the army had signed a “postmodern coup” on 28 February 1997. National Security 
Council served a declaration to the government and demanded from it to be careful 
against the danger of rising “political Islam.” The coalition government was repealed, 
and Refah Party was dissolved after the declaration yet Refah Party had continued to its 
political life under Fazilet Party after 1998.  
 
As seen in the case of 28 February 1998 postmodern coup, the military did not recognize 
national will and democracy once more. The army legalized its interventions to the 
democracy under the role of “guardianship of secularism” in Turkey. One of the most 
conspicuous terms is used during this period was “political Islam,” and it was a synthetic 
utilization to direct religion as an irrational fear against the policy. Religion was clearly 
indicated as an opposition figure against secularism. “For this reason, to be able to offer 
an analysis of the ways in which Islamists and secularists have positioned themselves 
against one another over the last 20 years in Turkey, one has to attend to the 
unconscious processes that structure the domain of the political and the role of these 
processes in the constitution of the Islamic/secularist schism” (Yeğenoğlu, 2011, p. 231). 
 
The state first focused on the organization of the public realm. Headscarf issue became 
an “issue” because of the limitation toward religion, and the state has argued headscarf 
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is a symbol of “political Islam” rather than a matter of a belief system. The attitude of 
the state again turned to the hostile separation between religion and state. By the effect 
of the direct intervention of the army to the policy, the Turkish state again targeted to 
produce a control mechanism over religion under a mask of protection of Republican 
principles that is mainly secularism. 
 
3.5.      General Critics toward History of Turkey Secularism 
Turkey has experienced various secularism models through the history of the Turkish 
Republic. While Turkey has applied a rigid form of secularism during single party era, it 
has softened with conservative political parties for a while until the 1990s. Military 
interventions had interrupted the softening process of secularism many times during this 
process. 
 
Many scholars draw a parallelism between French-style secularism and Turkey's first 
term secularism. For instance, Talas Asad argues that French secularism is the role model 
for secularism in Turkey. According to him, “the preoccupation with unity has been a 
central feature of authoritarian discourse and the requirement of loyalty to symbols of 
the nation is central to that political tradition… Those who are to be unified or integrated 
are required to submit to a particular normative order. This normative order in Turkey 
has been secular modernization (Asad, 2006, p. 496).” The normative order that Asad 
stressed was Turkey’s secularization process under the modernization project. The 
Kemalist character of secularism was not just aimed to separate religion and state; it also 
tended to regulate practicing way of religion in the private and public sphere. 
 
State intervention to religion was so clear at that term. So, according to these criteria, 
Turkey could be listed under Alfred Stepan’s twin intolerations model. Alfred Stepan is 
analyzing countries’ secularism models by looking at their attitudes toward religious civil 
groups. Twin intolerations model describes a state model that religion controlled by the 
elected government. The second model by David Barret’s analyzes the statements about 
religion in constitutions of states and make categorization among them to discuss they 
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have a state religion or not. Turkey is a country that indicates its identity as a secular 
country by the constitution. Yet, it also has a state religion on the single party era. Turkish 
Parliament amended the article of the constitution declaring Islam as the religion of the 
state in 1928. Hence, Turkey turned a constitutionally secular country without having a 
state religion on the single party era. Yet, Jonathan Fox makes another categorization 
over the constitutions of the states and argues that the state’s secularism levels and 
models are different in practice and theory. He analyzed that which states are declaring 
themselves as secular on their constitutions and their constitutional assertions are 
overlapped with their practices or not. In these two points, there are two approaches to 
justify. One of them is separationism; another one is the secularist-laicist model. In 
separationism, state policy is designed by a neutral attitude, but in the secularist-laicist 
model, the state has a role in restricting the presence of religion in the public sphere.  At 
that point, Turkey and France could be seen as examples of the secularist-laicist model. 
Jonathon Fox also argues that Turkey is a country which declares itself secular in the 
constitution but it does not exist totally in practice (Fox J. , 2011, p. 395). However, these 
results indicate that there are no arrangements of Catholicism in France. While Turkey 
and France were evaluated as secularist-laicist countries Germany, Italy, and Spain were 
categorized as separatist countries. 
 
Secularism criteria were settled by Jonathon Fox, and the changes could be observed 
over these criteria in terms of Turkey. Seven RAS variables were used to measure 
secularism levels of democratic states; “official support, official hostility, general 
restrictions, religious discrimination, religious regulation, religious legislation, general 
GIR” (Fox J. , 2007, p. 18). Less general GIR, restrictions, religious discriminations, 
religious regulation and religious legislation were observed after single party era in 
Turkey. According to Fox, if secularization theory were correct, one would expect to see 
that more economically developed countries are, the lesser less GIR they have. Thus, 
while Turkey was economically developed by conservative reformist parties, GIR was 
decreased. 
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On the stage that was started with the Democrat Party, political parties have built 
stronger relations with religion and religious groups in Turkey. Dismissive secularism 
model was left, and Turkey's secularism has transmitted to twin tolerations model as 
Stepan categorized. According to his twin toleration model, the state is secular but 
friendly to the religion (Stepan, 2000, p. 43). It could be seen that religion gained a wider 
space in the public realm. For instance, ezan began to be read again in Arabic, or religious 
schools were opened. In a similar manner, new religious communities born with the 
effect of migration from the village to the city and Democrat Party government led them 
to survive, even they did not legalize by the constitution.   
 
As different modeling, Veit Bader makes a categorization on the idea of religious 
pluralism in a modern state (Bader, 1999, p. 597). Bader is discussing religious pluralism 
in modern states and the difference between religious pluralism and secularism in 
modern states. He focuses on the cases of England and America. He argues that although 
England does not have a secular constitution or a state model, it has religious pluralism. 
In other words, it shows that although England does not have a secular constitution and 
administrative method, it is accepted as a modern Western state. As a result of this, 
social institutions are discussed around the place of religion in the state system. 
Secularism is described as a different form; England does not have a separation between 
church and state as it was on other modern Western countries but it does not mean that 
England is a religious state. Therefore, we can argue that England is a secular state that 
does not exclude religion from public life and state system. Turkey at its second stage 
was closed to Bader’s model in term of does not exclude religion from public life but it 
also had a secular constitution in the same time.  
 
Jose Casanova focuses on the importance of religious diversity, especially after the 
increase in the migration to Europe and makes a categorization about secularism over 
religious diversity (Casanova, 2008, pp. 101-119). The first category includes countries 
that have established a church with the free exercise of religion. The second category 
contains states that have formal disestablishment of the church and they constitutionally 
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separate religion and state with radical regulation and control over religion. The third 
category consists of the states that have a formal separation of church and state with 
informal multi-church quasi- establishments. By the reference to Stepan, Casanova also 
stresses the importance of religious pluralism because they indicate that “strict secular 
separation of church and state is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for 
democracy” (Casanova, 2008, p. 114). Therefore, after the single party era, the strict 
separation between religion and the state was destroyed. Yet, it is mostly seen that state 
control over the religion has always continued by the force of the military. Although 
Turkish policy tried to normalize secularism in the public realm, the military made several 
interventions under the role of guardianship of secularism. All these developments make 
Turkey a unique case to analyze. Even it is hard to categorize Turkey’s secularism under 
one category according to the world literature, it could be argued that Turkeys 
secularism has shifted from French style dismissive secularism to Fox’s separationist 
secularist model or it could also be claimed that Turkey’s secularism has changed model 
from Alfred Stepan’s twin intolerations to twin tolerations by the time even military 
interventions has suspended transformation of secularism. 
 
Turkey was under the dismissive secularism model until the early ages of the 21st century.  
Kemalist elites’ dismissive and hostile secularism means the rigid separation between 
public and private spheres, and it does not tolerate the visibility of religion in the public 
space. Republican elites have applied this model to create their idealized modern 
society. After the period started by the Democrat Party, press on the religion has 
decreased; and political parties attempted to open more space for the religion. However, 
the military was always in control and coded religion as a threat against secularism. Yet, 
hostile secularism did not decrease religiosity in Turkey.   
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CHAPTER 4  
TRANSFORMATION OF SECULARISM DURING THE AK PARTY ERA 
 
The meaning of secularism was mostly known as non-religiosity in Turkey because of the 
radical policies of the founder of the Turkish Republic. Secular policies were hostile to 
religion and mostly ignored the reality of practices of religious people in the public realm. 
The biggest issue was the drawing an unpassable wall between secular public space and 
neutral private sphere. Because people could not enter the public space with their 
religious identities, they felt compelled to make a choice to be religious or not. Rational 
society was different from what principle of Turkish Republic aimed to impose to the 
whole society. 
  
In the history of the Turkish Republic, it can be seen that there are two main models of 
secularism. The first categorization of secularism is closed to assertive secularism that 
limits the visibility of religion into the private sphere and has a control mechanism over 
religion in the public space. Assertive secularism rejects the role of religion on the society 
and supports the modernization theory that is arguing religion will lose its impact over 
the people by the time. Kemalist elites and the Turkish military were evaluated under 
this category because of their policies until that time. While Alfred Stepan says it is the 
twin intoleration model, Jonathon Fox says it is the laicist-secularist model. 
 
The second category of secularism that was commonly applied in Turkey is more closed 
to the dismissive secularism model. “Their representatives treated secularism as a 
process, not project and were in favour of flexible attitude to the relation of religion and 
politics, possible to modify depending of the social needs within the democratic dialogue 
(the postulate of a more democratic perception of secularism – in the spirit of religious 
freedom – is crucial for this approach)” (Szymański, 2007, p. 22). On the contrary of 
assertive secularism model, dismissive secularism argues religion is one of the key 
element on the society. The state guarantees religious rights of its citizens, and it should 
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be neutral for all religions. According to Alfred Stepan, it is the twin toleration, and 
Jonathon Fox says it is the separationist model. As opposed to world states’ tradition, 
center-right and conservative parties were the main indicators of the second category of 
secularism in Turkey and AK Party is the strongest and most efficient center-right party 
that transform Turkey's secularism from the first approach of secularism to the second 
one. 
 
AK Party has accepted secularism as a state principle but redefined it according to 
society’s expectations. As it is clearly seen from all reforms on the state-religion context, 
AK Party has applied the second form of secularism in Turkey and opened a more liberal 
and broader area in the public sphere for the religion. AK Party first stressed the 
importance of state neutrality for all religions and then destroyed the religious 
restrictions that were against the human rights and religious freedom over the religious 
people. 
 
4.1.      Why did Turkey Need a New Form of Secularism with AK Party? 
AK Party has played a key role in the transformation of secularism that structured in a 
rigid and dismissive form after the birth of the Turkish Republic. Although Turkey has 
experienced that a conservative party come to before, it was the first time that a 
conservative and Islamic based party stayed in power without distributed by a military 
coup. While Turkish Kemalist elites have afraid of coming “irtica” and disappearing 
secularism it can be argued that secularism had earned a liberal form that allows 
experiencing different practices of religion for all citizens. 
 
Turkey has been governed with democracy for ninety-five years under the Kemalist 
regime, but it is a debatable issue whether the Kemalist ideology has brought secularism 
and democracy to the country. As discussed in the previous chapters, Kemalist reforms 
were applied by the state force and military press with guardianship of the constitution. 
Secularism was accepted as a state principle by the protection of the constitution. 
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The presence of a state ideology like Kemalism is incompatible with a 
liberal democracy that does not only welcome plurality of views, 
programs, and ideologies but requires them for a ‘tutelage democracy’ 
supervised by the military and guarded by the judiciary, the Kemalists 
agencies within the state, not to a ‘liberal’ one…Kemalism was the basis 
of the single-party rule from 1925 to 1945 and has always been the basis 
on which to justify military coups since 1960 (Dağı, 2012, p. 31). 
 
Kemalist regime designed a governing system with a hierarchical model and put the elites 
on the top of the society and tended to design all other parts of the society according to 
top-down policies. Because of that secularism and modernism became icons of Kemalism 
to regulate citizens’ life. “Secularism and modernism were used to decide the way of 
lifestyle of citizens. Viewing the society as subject to the interferences of the state elite 
in order to modernize, secularize and nationalize them built a “hierarchical relationship 
between the state and society” (ibid, p. 31).  
 
It was a clear truth that religious part of the society was always evaluated as a 
disadvantaged group of Turkish society. Kemalist ideology had forced religious people to 
live ‘underground' (Kara, 2009, p. 72). Yet, after the AK Party, secularism had turned out 
to be separatist to regulate religion and state relations; it changed hostile attitudes of 
the state toward religion and religious citizens by the time.   
 
Now impossible to dictate that secularism is a way of life and that those 
who are not secular in their lifestyles are treated unequally and excluded 
from the center where power and resources are distributed… Thus, a 
post-Kemalist constitution is needed to redefine secularism in a more 
liberal and democratic manner that would accommodate religiosity in the 
public sphere, to ensure the neutrality of the state towards all different 
faiths and beliefs, and to stop the state from interfering in the religious 
realm (Ibid, p. 34). 
 
When AK Party first entered to the elections as a political party, it gained very high rate 
of the vote and gained the support of very different parts of the society such as liberals, 
social democrat or some leftist groups even it was evaluated as a conservative and partly 
Islamist political party because of political backgrounds of the party’s founders. The AK 
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Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan comes from “National Vision Movement” of Prof. Dr. 
Necmettin Erbakan. As a result of this, AK Party first focused on the proving the idea that 
their political identity is not a threat for Turkish secularism. Even AK Party was evaluated 
as a Sunni oriented conservative party, many different parts of the society supported 
Erdogan and AK Party because they believe AK Party can change the political order that 
was built by bureaucratic elites and destroyed democratic tutelage. AK Party has proved 
that they could change the order of Turkish politics by the support of citizens. 
 
…the AKP has gradually but steadily revised some of the institutional set-
ups of the secular model and successfully removed the old Kemalist 
establishment from state structures. The outcome of this transformation 
in reshuffling the restrictions of the Kemalist model, however, has been at 
best controversial. For some, the AKP-led reforms brought about the end 
of the Kemalist era and of the authoritarian reflexes of the Turkish state, 
becoming a turning point in the normalization of politics. (Aygenç, 2017, 
p. 71) 
 
4.2.      What was changed after the AK Party? 
4.2.1. Perception of ‘Conservative’ Party and Definition of Secularism 
The identity of the AK Party has always been discussed. While one part of the society 
believes that AK Party is a sign of differentiation of political Islam, another part believes 
that AK Party is a conservative democrat party that aims to build a balance between 
religion and state. On the one hand, the AK Party was founded by politicians who came 
from a political Islamic party, but on the other hand, the AK Party’s policy was based on 
the democratic values in social practices and liberal values on the economic practices. 
Moreover, the AK Party firstly aimed to complete the process of membership of EU when 
it came to power. It was an unusual policy according to a conservative party. The 
direction toward the EU signed the differentiation of AK Party from National Vision 
Movement. AK Party indicated that the EU values such as democracy, human rights, 
freedom of individuals, secularism and religious freedom were main points of their 
agendas. “Hence, such a strong emphasis on religious freedom as an indispensable 
indicator of laicism. This party expected the EU pre-accession period and possible 
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accession later to legitimize AKP activities aimed at the modification of laicism – through 
placing them in the context of reforms adjusting Turkey to the EU membership” 
(Szymański, 2007, p. 25).  
 
AK Party redefined secularism and applied it in a more liberal context. AK Party’s 
secularism model was defined under different names such as liberal secularism, passive 
secularism or Anglo Saxon secularism (Kuru, 2006, p. 146).  Scholars who propose that 
AK Party has a passive or Anglo-Saxon secularism model argue that AK Party is opposed 
to the authoritarian and repressive form of Kemalist secularism. Because of that AK Party 
first tended to solve problems that were born because of hostile attitudes of Kemalist 
secularism. 
 
One of the main reforms of the AK Party in terms of changing the shape of secularism 
was to redefine it on the party program. AK Party draws a picture that shows secularism 
as an instrument not to disappear religion from the public realm, on the contrary 
secularism was defined as a principle to serve religious pluralism and freedom to 
practicing what people believe without facing discrimination or press by the state. 
 
Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of 
humanity and secularism as a pre-requisite of democracy and an 
assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience. It also rejects the 
interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion. 
Basically, secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions and 
beliefs to comfortably practice their religions to be able to express their 
religious convictions and live accordingly but which also allows people 
without beliefs to organize their lives along these lines. From this point of 
view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace (Axiarlis, 2014, 
p. 72).  
 
As a tradition of Turkish politics, secularism was settled in the opposition of the religion 
within society, yet the AK Party clearly destroyed secularism’s hostile image against 
religion and gave a new form by supporting individual rights. By the new definition of 
secularism, the state had to be respectful of all religions and religious practices, and 
people could feel comfortable when they want to make religious practices. “Based on its 
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programme, one can expect the AKP to reform the state in order to make it neutral 
towards any beliefs or non-beliefs, but also to institutionalize freedom of religion so that 
discriminatory practices favoring Sunni Islam would be abolished, thus moving the 
Kemalist secularism towards a more egalitarian and inclusive model.” (Aygenç, 2017, p. 
78) Therefore, secularism did not exclude from state principles by the AK Party; it just 
turned to a liberal form that abolishes state control over citizens’ belief and it argues 
religious freedom is possible with secularism (J. Pupcenoks, 2012, s. 281). 
 
4.2.2. Role of the Military in Turkish Politics 
The role of the military in the Turkish politics has always been controversial. It was 
oriented itself as the twin brother of politics. While public sovereignty is the main 
governing motivation on the democratic regimes, the Turkish army that was driven by 
Kemalist elites frequently disturbed the Turkish democracy by referencing principles of 
the Kemalist regime such as secularism. “As ‘a self-appointed primary modernizer 
institution’ and ‘the vanguard of reform and the harbingers of enlightenment’ as well as 
“the ultimate guardian of the secular Republic against internal/external threats”, the 
military enjoyed the authority to project its power into the public and political sphere” 
(Aygenç, 2017, p. 73). The military has behaved with a protectionist reflex against 
religious groups and religious materials in the public sphere. Yet, the protectionist and 
dismissive voice of the military has changed since 1980. The Turkish military tended to 
use religion as a control mechanism over citizens by adopting religion into public and 
military education. “This was especially apparent after the 1980 military intervention, 
when the army helped to institutionalize the role of religion and to expand its hegemony 
by making religious instruction compulsory in public schools, opening up several imam-
hatip (religious vocational) schools across the country, and ensuring constitutional 
protection for the Diyanet” (Ibid, 2017, p. 74).  
 
The army first draws a true religion model for all citizens that are based on Sunni Islam 
teachings. As Kemalist elites never aimed to create a non-religious society, the Turkish 
army also did not seek to create a non-believer society; it just tented to adopting Islamic 
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values into modernized Turkish society. Religion was always seen as an integrative 
material within different segments of society. Turkish military just focused on the 
creation of a religiously homogeneous society with principles of Western modernization. 
Therefore, wearing a headscarf or making visible other practices of religion was 
restricted by the hand of the military and Kemalist elites. All conservative parties who 
winked at religious groups and religious freedom in the public sphere have faced an 
intervention such as Democrat Party or Virtue Party. In that sense, it could be arguing 
that the AK Party has a special place on the state history. AK Party is the first party that 
won the political superiority against the military on the history of the Turkish Republic. 
 
AK Party has reversed the military intervention tradition even it also faced a small 
warning in 2007. The Turkish army has announced and remembered its guardianship role 
on the secularism one more time. According to this text, the military has said that: 
 
Recently, the prominent problem during the presidential election process 
has been focused on debating secularism. This situation has been 
followed with concern by the Turkish Armed Forces. It should not be 
forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces has a side in these debates and 
is an absolute protector of secularism. Moreover, the Turkish Armed 
Forces are absolutely against the ongoing debates and negative 
comments, and, when needed, will put forward its attitude and deed, 
openly and clearly. No one should doubt that … the Turkish Armed Forces 
are resolute in performing the duties assigned to it by the laws (Ibid, 2017, 
p. 74).  
 
The declaration above indicates that the Turkish army never intended to give up its role 
of guardianship over society by reference to secularism. Even AK Party was elected with 
the very high support of the society, and even the society did not question AK Party 
because of its policies are against the secularism, the army found the right to threatened 
Turkey’s governing political party and it claimed that AK Party has behaved against 
secularism. The role of the Constitutional court also changed after announcing this e –
declaration of the military. “In 2007 it was expressed by the army emphasizing publicly 
its further readiness to defend the principle of laicism in response to AKP activities, which 
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were contradictory to the principle according to Kemalist elites, and later by the 
Constitutional Court which adjudicated on the AKP dissolution in connection with the 
violation of the principle of laicism” (Szymański, 2007, p. 24). Even constitutional court 
aimed to close a selected political party it could not reach the success. Politics won 
against the bureaucratic tutelage for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic. 
 
AK Party’s political agenda first aimed to struggle with Kemalist elites, bureaucratic 
tutelage, and the military and hostile, dismissive and oppressive form of secularism 
beside goals on economic and political developments since the first day that it came to 
power.  AK Party has come to power with very high support in 2007. While AK Party has 
gained the election with 34% of the votes in 2002, in the next election the AK Party’s 
vote was increased to 46% in 2007. It was a real political success that was never 
experienced before. It has gained vote from very different parts of the society; it was not 
just a political party that address conservative, Islamist or religious people of the society. 
AK Party has portrayed a different image apart from classical conservative parties by 
drive its politics based on the values of the world politics. AK Party has stressed the 
importance of democratization and human rights. Secularism also was mentioned as a 
state principle, but secularism addressed the state neutrality for all religions in the AK 
Party’s context. Therefore, the image of political Islam has changed and the AK Party 
showed that Islamic background politicians might open broader space to liberties and 
democracy. 
 
4.2.3. Structure of State Bureaucracy   
Although AK Party won the 2002 election, it could not open a free area to make its own 
policies because of deep-seated bureaucracy by Kemalist elites in the state institutions. 
It reached a success to transform bureaucracy after 2007. The reaction of the army and 
the Constitutional Court against AK Party was the sign of difficulty to change assertive 
secularism in the state bureaucracy. Yet being President of Abdullah Gül with his Islamic 
background and his veiled wife had indicated that state bureaucracy started to change 
even Kemalist seculars were still afraid of ‘sharia.’ “AKP policy after 2007 does not lead 
 52 
 
to the creation of a confessional state based on Sharia, but is subject to the further 
evolution of the Turkish secularism giving increasingly moderate character to its initial 
radical assertive type (strengthening of “soft” assertive secularism)” (Szymański, 2007, 
p. 27). 
 
It was the first time that a politician, Abdullah Gül, who is known as a religious person 
became the President of Turkey. One of the most important symbols which reflect his 
Islamic identity was commented over the headscarf of his wife. When Abdullah Gül 
became the president, he was criticized because of his wife’s headscarf. Wife of 
bureaucrats and secular politicians did not participate the receptions if they are using 
headscarf. Moreover, the headscarf issue on the universities was continuing. Women 
who wanted to use headscarf could not enter the universities and they could not work 
in public service. In that sense, it would not be a surprise that the wife of Abdullah Gül 
became a big problem for Kemalist elites.  
 
Because Kemalist elites who support assertive secularism was against the Presidency of 
Abdulah Gül, they started to organize “Meetings of Republic” to save secularism on 
different cities of Turkey. Main arguments used against the presidency of Abdullah Gül 
revolved around the headscarf of his wife. It was a reaction to assertive secularism. 
Despite the normalization process, a strong struggle occurred between the assertive 
secularists and others. Because of this, AK Party could solve the headscarf issue just on 
2012. 
 
After new regulation about the headscarf women has gained not just right to enter 
universities, they also started to become part of social and economic life. Religious 
women who use headscarf were eliminated from social and economic life. The 
explanations of Fazıl Say who was very well known Turkish pianist about headscarf is 
indicated how women were isolated by the Kemalist assertive secularists. He says “Our 
dreams are somewhat dead in Turkey. All ministers’ wives wear a headscarf. I want to 
move somewhere else . . . I am waiting for the dialogue of the counterpart for six years. 
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There are some things that annoy me . . . Turkey’s music lover characteristic is being 
destroyed” (Hermann, 2007). After 2008 most universities have accepted women 
students with the headscarf and after 2013 women have taken place on the public and 
civil services. State bureaucracy started to change with the image of working women 
with the headscarf. While the headscarf issue was seen as a problem of education, it was 
a deep issue of the assertive secular model of bureaucracy. Yet, the restriction continued 
for the women on the area of military and judiciary but they could enter the parliament 
with the headscarf. In that sense, it would not be wrong to argue that Turkey has left 
French model assertive secularism and became more liberal then French (Kaya, 2015, 
pp. 55-56). 
 
4.2.4. Structure of National Education 
Monopolization of the national education occurred with the Unification of Education Law 
in 1924 constitution. Until this time, national education was used as a transfer 
mechanism of the state to impose its own policies. Religious education was also an 
important part of the state policy to teach how to become a good citizen according to 
the principle of secularism. 
 
With the constitution of 1924, all religious schools were abandoned and the state just 
opened imam-hatip schools to provide religious education. Imam-hatip schools first 
aimed to provide a homogenization and engrained nationalism and secularism as the 
cement of the new society. Imam-hatip schools draw certain criteria and standards to 
make religious practices and advised citizens to limit their religious practices on the 
private sphere. Then imam-hatip schools were closed down in 1930 yet they were 
opened in 1948 again. Transferring Turkish democracy from one party to multi-party 
system led re-opening of the imam – hatip schools yet 1971 military coup again bring 
limitation to religious education. “However, in 1980 the military promoted imam-hatips 
again in order to gain popular support and to spread a nationalized and homogenizing 
version of Islam as an antidote to leftist ideologies and booming claims of diverse 
ethnoreligious communities.” (Aygenç, 2017, p. 76) Therefore, although perspectives of 
 54 
 
the military and the state have changed, it is clearly seen that their attitudes never based 
on the religious freedom or main motivation of them to change their attitudes were 
never be related with the change in the idea of secularism before AK Party. 
 
Establishment of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) also was commented as the fruit of 
1980 military coup to regulate universities to convert them as a secular form. After the 
establishment of YÖK, the state has the right to control universities on the several areas. 
One of the main obstacles that were born with YÖK was the headscarf ban for the Muslim 
women in Turkey. According to the YÖK, the headscarf was a symbol of political Islam 
and because of that is should be abandoned. Wearing headscarf was evaluated as an 
obstacle for Turkish secularism by the effect of French style dismissive secularism 
policies. On the one hand, the state has argued headscarf ban was necessary to secure 
secularism in Turkey, but on the other hand individual rights of the Muslim women were 
ignored by the state. 
 
Because of the headscarf issue, hundreds of women could not continue their higher 
education. Headscarf ban did not just limit women’s religious rights, it also restrained 
women's right of education and social rights because the understanding of secularism 
was based on the restriction of individual’s religious life under the effect of Kemalist 
ideology. One of the most important reforms of the AK Party was about the headscarf 
issue. 
 
“The period of 2002-2008 was the time when these AKP convictions about a secular state 
were present in the declarative sphere, but they translated into concrete activities and 
political initiatives in a slightly limited scope and usually were written into the context of 
democratization and ensuring religious freedom” (Szymański, 2007, p. 23). AK Party’s 
first attempt to change the form of secularism over education has occurred at 2005 with 
the regulation studies about imam-hatip schools and headscarf issue. Even AK Party has 
intended to change constitutional points that led to the headscarf issue, it faced with the 
veto of Ahmet Necdet Sezer who was known as a Kemalist elite. During the first period 
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of the AK Party, it has a limited power on the state bureaucracy and policies were not 
strong enough to change the form of secularism. Constitutional Court also was angry 
with the AK Party because they believed that the party was against secularism in the 
country. 
 
After a revision in the politics, headscarf abolition was destroyed in 2012. AK Party has 
prepared a new political agenda to solve problems arising with French model secularist 
system. After cessation of restriction about the headscarf, Turkey’ secularism has driven 
into a more liberal and passive form with AK Party. AK Party opened new areas for all 
disadvantaged groups of the society such as Kurds or Alevis and started a polarization 
process. “They appear to have set the wheels in motion—albeit inadvertently—for the 
AK Party’s electoral victory and contributed to its metamorphosis into a dominant party, 
the emergence of a “New Turkey,” an unprecedented polarization on all levels of Turkish 
society” (Keyman, 2014, p. 19). 
 
AK Party has evaluated religion not a control mechanism over the society; it accepted 
religion as a part of Turkish culture and morality. In that sense, it was not surprising that 
religious education has changed shape in the secondary schools as well. Many elective 
courses were opened to teach different parts of the religion such as Koran, Life of 
Prophet Muhammed and Rudiments of Religion. The name of religious classes was 
changed to “Religious Culture and Morality” (Szymański, 2007, p. 58). 
 
4.2.5. Status of Alevis and Reaction to Homogenization Policies of Kemalist Elites 
While Kemalist secularism has used religion as a control mechanism over society and 
tended to create a homogeneous modern-secular society, AK Party gave signs to accept 
religious differences with a new term and Alevi problem was one of the main crisis that 
was born after the establishment of secular Turkish Republic. Because Kemalist elites 
aimed to create a modern society based on Sunni Islam, they ignored and assimilated 
Alevis and did not recognize them as a religious group. In that sense, the place of Diyanet 
is also important. It is interesting enough to have an institution to regulate religion on 
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the secular state affairs. Moreover, the Directorate of Religious Affairs was used as a tool 
to regulate religion for many years. Especially 1982 coup constitution strength the role 
of designed Sunni Islam to mobilize all parts of the society. “Especially when it came to 
the Alevi question, the assertively secular Turkish state suddenly became a Sunni one” 
(Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 1197). Sunni Islam was supported by the state because it was seen 
as a protector of citizens from many threats such as Communism or socialism. In the 
same time having an Alevi identity also seen as a threat against the unity of the Turkish 
Republic. Alevi identity was on the target to be assimilated and to be ignored for many 
years. Yet, during the AK Party term, Alevis had gained recognition by the state by the 
reference to religious freedom and human rights. 
 
In 2009, AK Party declared the Alevi opening as a first policy that aimed to integration on 
the Turkish Republic history. Until the AK Party time, Alevis has just faced with denial 
and impression policies. It was the first time that Alevi's demands were recognized and 
entered to the political agenda. Alevis have demanded equal recognition to their way of 
belief and recognition of the legal status of Cem houses. They also were against the 
compulsory religious education on the schools because syllabus was organized according 
to Sunni-Islam criteria. AK Party has organized seven workshops to regulate demands of 
Alevis since 2009. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has invited Alevi leaders to discuss and they also 
have served many photos from iftar organizations in the Ramazan. They all indicate an 
integration policy of the AK Party without discriminate or assimilate one group. Kemalist 
secularism did not lead different religious groups to occur in the society and politics. 
Religious education was designed to impose state religion to the children. Yet, after the 
AK Party term, it could be seen that religious education has changed the structure and 
turned to a pluralistic form. Many different courses were adopted to the syllabus as 
elective courses. It means that the state could offer to teach different forms of religion. 
Hence, Alevi opening was also another claim on the argument that AK Party has 
transformed hostile and dismissive secularism form of Kemalist ideology and turned it to 
more liberal and inclusive form by recognizing different segments of Islamic groups. AK 
Party did not only reorganize the relations of the state with Alevi groups; it has also made 
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multiple opening with different religious societies. If it is remembered that Kemalist 
secularism has forced religious societies to disappear and went into the underground, 
the AK Party’s secularism has a crucial place on the reserve state-religion relations in 
terms of secularism context. 
 
4.2.6. Relations of the State and Religious Groups 
One of the most important relations that was revised with AK Party is the relation of the 
state with religious communities of course. Religious communities were the main target 
of Kemalist secularism and they were all abandoned after the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. As many other republican reforms did not answer the necessities of 
the Turkish society, the abolition of religious communities also did not overlap needing 
and expectation of the society from the state. While Republican elites aimed to 
transform society into a Western-style modern society they found dangerous the link 
between citizen and religious communities. 
 
While Islam was purged from the public sphere in the early republican 
period, the state kept a firm control over it by banning the tarikats and 
establishing the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı– 
DİB). Active intervention and control were viewed as the only means to 
secure the containment of the perceived threat from political Islam to the 
state’s secular ideals and goals (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 1197). 
 
Yet, they did not notice that modernization bring many challenges to the Turkish society 
and religious communities have served a unity channel for many of them. Moreover, on 
the one hand, while Republican elites found dangerous religious communities by reason 
of they were against secularism, on the other hand, they turned religious communities 
into more opaque and hidden institutions rather than destroy them totally. It was a big 
paradigm for Turkish secularism and AK Party took a step to overcome this paradigm by 
refreshing relations of the state with religious communities. 
 
Kemalist secularism totally rejected the visibility of religious communities in society and 
announced them as illegal institutions for the state. After losing their legitimacy by the 
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state religious communities has tried to find new methods to survive. Therefore, in that 
sense, it is not surprising that they have widened their efficiency as underground 
intuitions. Although conservative parties have always developed pragmatic relations 
with religious communities any political party did not give them legal status and led to 
widening them as opaque communities. To have a healthy relationship between religion 
and the state first the state should consider the reality of its society and should develop 
practices according to these realities. AK Party partly noticed the importance of 
transform religious societies into transparent societies for the sake of secularism. 
 
While it is debatable that religious communities are against the secularism or not it 
should be understood that why Turkish society needs religious communities. As an 
interesting point, even Kemalist secularism was against them, religious communities 
were the presence of assertive Turkish secularism. When Turkey has experienced a rapid 
transformation process, religious communities served a way to have social solidarity to 
their members. Especially on the migration process from village to the city, religious 
communities offered people to settle themselves into the modern world. People wished 
to belong to be a group to make religious practices together and to share the same way 
of living in crowded and modernized society. Religious communities were born first as 
countryman organizations in the cities and then gained economic and social powers. 
They are also a formalization to supply the needs of religious people in the city life 
economically. For instance, student dormitories or schools were the first choices of 
religious people in cities. 
 
After transforming Turkish democracy into multi-party system press over the religious 
communities was decreased. Religious societies have developed strong relations with 
increasing economic, social and politic impact except for the terms that were interrupted 
by military coups. Relations that were based on a dialectical pragmatic relation between 
political parties and religious groups were developed over two main points. While 
religious groups demand legal status from the state that accepted religious communities 
as a threat in the legal world, political parties and especially conservative center-right 
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parties demanded support of them on the elections (Kara, 2009, p. 339). This pragmatic 
relation has continued on the term of the AK Party. Without ignoring the social reality of 
religious communities AK Party widened visibility of religion in the public and private 
areas and it is clearly seen that religious people have developed economically and 
sociologically by the time. Yet, this made religious people more powerful and decreased 
the necessity of religious communities as a needing for religious people.    
 
Status of religious communities is related to the transformation of center and periphery 
in Turkey (Mardin Ş. , 2003, p. 201).  While the AK Party has transformed the sense of 
secularism, it also touches the other sides of the society. Religious groups have gained 
more power over different segments of the life and thanks to this power it was easier to 
resist against the press of Kemalist elites. Strained relations of conservatives with 
political power has strained in economically at the same time (Demir, 2005, p. 875). 
While state bureaucracy has changed by the time with the replacement of Kemalist elites 
from the center to periphery religious people have also gained power economically. 
Because religious people could gain the power their needing for religious communities 
were decreased.  
 
AK Party did not see religion as an anti-secular value and opened more space to religion 
and religious groups thanks to its secularism model. This led to different outcomes for 
both sides. While religion could be practiced in the private and public space people did 
not need to find alternative ways to make real their religious practices and demand for 
them were decreased. In the same time, it would be wrong to argue that religious 
communities will disappear if the state opens more space for religion. Yet, it is clear that 
legalization of religious groups under different names of foundation or legal societies is 
used to control them. 
 
It is clear that the Turkish legal system and practiced daily life does not coincide with 
each other. Even the Turkish constitution has banned the different religious communities 
it is well known that people still continue to belong to “illegal” religious communities. 
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Visibility of the religious groups has changed over time mainly according to existing 
political power. While radical laic political view evaluates religious groups as a security 
threat against laic and secular Turkish Republic, political parties have utilized religious 
communities as “potential voters”. Bilateral relations between religious groups and the 
main political party has continued at AK Party term as an inevitable consequence of 
politics but in a different shell. 
 
AK Party has transformed the idea of secularism in Turkey to a more liberal and 
democratic line instead of radical laicism. While radical secularism was pressed majority 
of Turkish people by its oppressive and prohibitive religion policies, AK Party applied 
liberal or passive laicism model that gives more space and right to religion in public 
space. By this way, religious societies which gain power and popularity over religious 
injustice started to lose its importance within the society. Moreover, liberal religion 
policies pushed opaque and “underground” religious societies to transform its structure 
to become more transparent and visible. FETÖ and 15 July have opened a new tab to 
discuss ties between state and religion in terms of laicism policies. At the end of all 
debates, it would not be wrong to argue that Turkish Republic’s radical laicism policies 
fostered religious societies. Because religious groups’ activities were banned by the 
constitution they tended to find “alternative ways” to perform religious practices within 
a group. Also, losing legality of religious groups after laicism pushed groups to be 
organized themselves as ‘underground’ and that makes them more dangerous and 
uncontrolled mechanisms for the state.  
 
So far it could be argued that Republican elites tended to create a safer society that is 
far away from the threat of sharia or despotism of religion by the prohibition of religious 
groups yet it caused to make religious groups more dangerous to the state by forcing 
them to survive as illegal and underground institutions. Likewise, prohibition of the 
religious societies did not appropriate the realities and needs of the society at that time. 
So, it could be arguing that AK Party has changed the way of the relation between the 
state and religious groups by accepting them as a social reality and AK Party did not 
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evaluate them as a threat to secularism. Even relations of state and religion have not 
placed on a full clear and explicit space, it is seen that a more liberal secularism 
understanding turned religious groups as a less dangerous form for the state. 
 
4.3. How AK Party has Changed Turkish Secularism according to the World Literature 
While Turkey has faced many problems because of the different applications of 
secularism pluralism was seen as a solution mechanism. Especially because of the 
problems that were reasoned by the visibility of religion on the public sphere, a pluralist 
public sphere was indicated as a cure for the problems of secularism (Çınar Ü. C., 2003, 
p. 327). Turkey secularism system was always found closed to French assertive laic 
system. As one of the key figure of the AK Party, Yalçın Akdoğan defined secularism as 
an instrument to stabilize state neutrality toward religion. 
 
The AK Party’s understands ‘secularism’ as an institutional stance and 
method, which ensures that the state remains neutral and keeps an equal 
distance from all religions and ideas; differences of religion and/or 
different confessions and ideologies can be professed in social peace 
without them turning into conflict. The party thinks that, for secularism to 
work as an adjudicating institution of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms under constitutional protection, it needs to be supported by 
democracy and operate in a conciliatory environment. (Akdoğan, 2004, p. 
6)  
 
As it could be understood from the definition of secularism for the AK Party, secularism 
did not symbolize non-religiosity. It also could be arguing that the AK Party did not 
mention the state control over religion. While AK Party has transformed passive 
secularism it did not remove religion from the public sphere yet it turned state policy as 
a neutral tone with respect to religious rights of citizens. While AK Party opened a 
broader area for the religion and led visibility of Islam in the public sphere it did not 
convert secularism into radical militant Islamization in the society; AK Party’s reforms 
and studies were part of the process to turn passive secularism model from assertive 
secularism (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 1201).  
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AK Party gave reference to the EU values when it transformed secularism in Turkey. 
Because it was shown as an Islamist party to whole the world by Kemalist elites it always 
emphasized that changing on the secularism were not Islamic background; they are 
values of the EU. Religious freedom and liberalization on the society were necessities of 
a democratic society according to EU principles and while AK Party broadens the visibility 
of religion on the public sphere it also argued that the AK Party developed 
democratization standards. 
 
It was clearly seen that the clash of modes of secularism on different segments of social 
and political life would continue if the structure of politics did not change. Because of 
that AK Party was seen as a hope to change the form of structure Kemalist secularism in 
Turkey. “This paradoxical relationship does make sense once secularism is understood 
as a ‘device’ to control religion and exclude conservative social forces from exercising 
political influence.” (Dağı, 2012, p. 34) Yet, especially after the change of the constitution 
with the AK Party, the state left the responsibility of being “controlling mechanism” over 
religion. It could be observed that the visibility of religion in the public space was 
increased and people could make religious practices without afraid of state. On that 
sense, it can be argued that AK Party has transformed Turkey’s secularism from French 
style dismissive secularism model to more closed form to more liberal form. It can also 
be argued that Turkey’s secularism has transformed from twin intoleration secularism to 
twin toleration in terms of Alfred Stepan modeling of secularism. Because twin 
intoleration model includes government imposition and control over religion twin 
toleration model serves friendly attitudes toward religion and relation between religion 
and the state is developing in a sociologically spontaneous way (Stepan, 2000, p. 43). 
 
Also, the AK Party changed the structure of secularism from secularist-laicist model to 
separationist model according to Jonathan Fox modeling. In separationism, state policy 
is designed by a neutral attitude of the state over religion but in the secularist-laicist 
model, the state has a role in restricting the presence of religion in the public sphere (Fox 
J. , 2011, p. 390). AK Party has widened the visibility of religion on different segments of 
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the life and it also did not exclude religious people because they prefer to live with their 
religious identities in the public sphere. Fox also makes another categorization over 
state’s constitution and argues states could be listed under four category that is 
“Secular–Laicist States, States Declaring SRAS, States Whose Constitutions Do Not 
Address the Issue, States with Oﬃcial Religions” (Ibid, p. 391). Main variables to make 
these categorizations are based on the religious diversity, religious identity, population, 
regime, stability and economic development. In the article, there are 14 countries that 
declare themselves secular in the constitution but it does not exist totally in practice and 
Turkey is in that category. Therefore, Fox argues that Turkey is a democratic country that 
declares itself as secular by the constitution but in practice, Turkey is not a secular 
country. It can be argued that Turkey also changed category according to Fox modeling. 
After the AK Party term, it would be wrong to say that Turkey is a country that aimed to 
show it secular just on the theory by the constitution. AK Party gave more importance to 
the practical life of the politics and tried to design politics according to citizens’ needing. 
It was clearly seen that people got tired to be governing with a coup constitution and 
because of that constitution changing was occurred with a high level of participation in 
2010. 57.9% of the participants said “yes” to change the coup constitution (Elections, 
2017). After changing the constitution, individual rights and liberties have widened. It is 
indicated that to become secular is not an obstacle to permit different ways of living in 
a state after the changing of the Turkish constitution.   
 
Veit Bader also makes a categorization on secularism over religious pluralism in modern 
states and the difference between religious pluralism and secularism in modern states. 
While it is mostly focused on the view of liberal state about religion under religious 
pluralism, it also talks about the difference between religious pluralism and secularism 
for modern states. He deeply analyzed the case of England and argued that England as a 
case that does not have a separation between church and state on its constitution. “They 
questioned whether religious freedom and equal treatment of all religions requires 
disestablishment and whether political equality requires a complete separation between 
state and (organized) religions or even a complete privatization of religion” (Bader, 1999, 
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p. 597). As it shows that even England did not have a secular constitution and 
administrative method, it is accepted as a modern Western state. Consequently, it is 
indicated by Bader, to be democratic and secular it is more important to have religious 
freedom and equal treatment for all citizens who believe and live differently than to have 
a secular constitution in theory. The transformation of the AK Party term mainly has 
targeted to reach equal standards of the government for all parts of the society. 
 
In the end, it would not be wrong to argue that Turkey’s assertive and dismissive 
secularism that was established by Kemalist elites has transformed in AK Party era and 
turned to more liberal and softer version. The meaning of secularism also has changed 
and transformed from being separatist modes of the state and religion to a regulation 
mechanism over the state and religion relations. State neutrality and religious freedom 
were applied with AK Party for the first time in Turkish history even AK Party also could 
not reach full neutrality and religious freedom yet. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
Secularism is not a term with a universally accepted definition. Naturally, it is a term that 
focuses on the separation of religion and the state yet there are no fixed and clear 
boundaries to define the scope of this separation. While the visibility of religion in the 
public space might be totally forbidden in a secular country, we might observe no conflict 
but dialogue between the state and religion in other examples. Even there are certain 
types of secularism models in theory, it is seen that every state aims to harmonize its 
secularism model with its own cultural, economic and political context and values. 
Because empirical variation is abundant, it is hard to define secularism models. Especially 
Turkey as a fluctuating country in its political trajectory has changed its secularism 
policies in different periods of its history. While Turkey experienced stricter and harder 
tone of secularism at the beginning of its history with Kemalist secularism policies, it has 
seen much contestation in its multiparty era. In that sense, the latest phase of Turkey’s 
multipart era is quite distinct. The major actor of this last phase, the AK Party should be 
analyzed deeply because it has carried out effective reforms to change the sense of 
secularism establishment. 
 
The thesis first analyzed main secularism models in the world literature. Twin Tolerations 
Model of Alfred Stepan, David Barret’s model of secularism, Shmuel Sandler’s secularism 
models, Veit Bader’s secularism model over religious pluralism, Jose Casanova’s 
secularism model and lastly Jonathon Fox’s different categorizations about secularism 
were analyzed in this thesis.  
 
Alfred Stepan’s secularism does not imply a hostile separation of religion and the state. 
He argues that countries such as Turkey and France have misunderstood the meaning of 
secularism.  Alfred Stepan makes a separation between twin tolerations and 
intolerations and listed varieties of democratic and non-democratic patterns of religion 
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– state relations (Stepan, 2000).  While twin tolerations are seen at democratic states, 
twin intolerations were associated with non-democratic states. While twin toleration 
model is friendly to democracy, twin intoleration matches neither with democracy nor 
with secularism. Hence, when the level of democracy in any state enhances, it gets closer 
to twin toleration with religious freedom because it rejects the idea of hostile separation. 
Turkey’s experience can also be seen on this terms as its democracy fell short especially 
during the terms when strict secularist policies were imposed in a top-down way. 
 
Jonathon Fox’s work, the second significant conceptualization for this thesis, makes 
several categorizations over secularism for different countries by determining different 
variables to determine secularism models of the states. He looks for the government 
involvement in religion (GIR), state’s constitution and level of democracy on the 
countries by analyzing official support, official hostility, general restrictions, religious 
discrimination, religious regulation and religious legislation of the states. He offers two 
categories: separationism and secularist-laicist model. While the separationist model 
means that the state policy is designed by a neutral attitude toward religion, the 
secularist-laicist model gives the state a role in restricting the presence of religion in the 
public sphere (Fox J. , 2007). This thesis focused on this categorization of Fox and 
evaluated Turkey’s secularism models as a transformation toward separationism from 
the secularist-laicist model.  
 
The thesis traced this conceptualization in Turkey’s political history. The relationship 
between the state and religion has always been problematic in Turkey. Turkey’s 
secularism adventure can be examined in three main terms: The first term was under 
the control of the single party system that can be called as dismissive secularism (1923-
1950), the second term was designed by conservative right parties, which offered softer 
secular policies but also repressed by the centrist bureaucracy (1050-2002). As the last 
step, it was concluded with the AK Party’s term that was considered as regulative 
secularism which means as a form of secularism that aimed to regulate the relations 
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between the secular state and religious and non-religious people in a more religion-
friendly, tolerant, passive way.    
 
Especially after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Kemalist elites had applied 
dismissive secularism and ignored the importance of religion for the citizens. Their 
hostile secularism understanding was supported by many reforms such as the regulation 
of wearing religious clothes or banning of ezan in Arabic. Religious items such as 
headscarf for the women or beard for the men were also abolished in the official circles. 
Religious schools were closed and tarikats were announced as illegal institutions by the 
secular Turkish state. Latin alphabet was accepted as the official alphabet of the Turkish 
state and this reform also had links with the secularism model to be built. Because 
Kemalist elites evaluated religion as an obstacle for the rise of a modern, secular and 
Western Turkey, religion was repressed. After center-right parties came to power in 
1950, hard assertive secularism policies shifted to a softer version yet bureaucratic elites 
such as the military and the Constitutional Court often imposed assertive secularism by 
making interventions to the democracy. 
 
AK Party opened a new phase in the history of Turkey’s secularism. It is seen that 
conservative parties affected the idea of secularism before but they could not achieve 
radical changes. Even AK Party could not resolve the problems around Turkish secularism 
completely, but its ending of the military tutelage system gave it more space before its 
predecessors. AK Party declared that secularism means state neutrality for all citizens 
without repressing people based on their religion or devout religious lives. It was not 
easy to challenge the established Kemalist elites and state bureaucracy in the first stage, 
but freeing the use of headscarf became a cornerstone success for AK Party. Women 
could enter the universities and business life after a long time. It also led women to use 
the headscarf on the public services. Visibility of religion increased and people have 
become not afraid of doing religious practices in the public sphere. The number of Imam-
Hatip schools and Quran courses has also increased. Inequality between Imam-Hatip 
students and other students in the university entrance exams ended. Alevis gained 
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unofficial but gestural recognition by the state and their teachings have found more 
space in the curriculums. The Alevi opening has started yet it could not be completed. 
However, it was an important step for the state bureaucracy to open a new place for 
different interpretations of Islam. AK Party also regulated relations with the military and 
did not allow the military to declare itself as the guarantor or guardian of secularism. It 
also reorganized the ties between religious communities and the state. While Kemalist 
secularism rejected the existence of religious communities AK Party has accepted the 
social reality of religious communities and build an informal relationship with them. 
 
Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that in the AK Party term Turkey has shifted 
to twin toleration model from twin intoleration according to Alfred Stepan theory.  The 
religious pluralism that is based on organized state-religion relations has increased. 
Turkey has a formal separation of religion and state yet it also has religious institutions 
and did not accept them as illegal as it was on the Kemalist secularism. Turkey has been 
closer to the separationist model that implies that state policies are designed by the 
neutral attitude rather than the secularist-laicist model.   
 
The thesis analyzed main categorizations about secularism and then criticized the 
historical background of Turkey by giving reference to such secularism models. Lastly, it 
focused on the AK Party term to analyze how it transformed the secularism model in 
Turkey. Boundaries of the categorizations are transitive and there are many factors that 
affect the state's secularism models. 
 
The thesis aimed to categorize secularism models based on the literature and evaluate 
Turkey’s secularism models. Nevertheless, it would be better to determine more 
concrete and quantifiable indicators to determine these modes of secularism. It should 
not be ignored that every state has its own identity with its historical, traditional, 
cultural, economic and political heritage and because of that it will require a deeper 
historical and comparative analysis. Moreover, even the literature review involves a wide 
range of scholars, it is seen that most of the studies focused on the Western- Christian 
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states. On the studies that are analyzing both Muslim and non-Muslim states mostly 
argues that “contemporary global discourse on Islam as a fundamentalist anti-modern 
and undemocratic religion shows striking similarities with the old discourse on 
Catholicism that predominated in Anglo-Protestant societies, particularly in the United 
States, from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century” (Casanova, 2008, p. 110). It 
could be better to open another section to compare studies that analyze Muslim-secular 
states with Christian-secular states. These are the major limitations of this thesis and 
should be studied in greater depth in the future research.   
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